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Abstract
This thesis addresses the classic problem of freedom and responsibility, focusing 
on the way that certain issues within metaethics might be seen to have a bearing on 
this issue.
Various theorists have appealed to the concept of reason in order to explain 
responsibility. 1 will begin by discussing reason-based views of responsibility, 
specifically supporting Susan Wolfs view against certain criticisms that have been 
levelled against it.
1 will argue that in order to be held responsible for an act, the agent must bear 
the right kind of relation to the reasons for acting that she is subject to, and that such 
reasons must be considered “objective” in the sense of being independent of the 
individual’s subjective aims and desires. 1 will defend the view that there can be 
reasons that are objective in this sense against Bernard Williams’s argument that all 
true reasons claims must depend on subjective conditions.
1 will argue, in particular, that moral obligations cannot be plausibly explained 
in the same way that Williams explains other reasons claims. This allows us to adopt 
the above explanation of responsibility at least for moral reasons. This means we can 
still account for the most important and interesting cases: we can still account for 
moral responsibility.
1 will go on to argue for an alternative explanation of moral duties, influenced 
by Mill and Strawson. This involves explaining moral obligations, and the kind of 
normative pressure we associate with them, in terms of the justification we might have 
for adopting certain attitudes towards an agent in response to their acts. Such 
justification relates both to the objectivity of moral reasons, and to facts about the 
quality of the agent’s will towards others.
1 will build on this view of moral obligations in developing a positive account 
of the conditions of responsibility.
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Introduction
The purpose of this discussion will be to examine the problem of free will and 
determinism, with the aim of developing plausible conditions for responsibility that 
reflect a plausible explanation of moral obligations, and of the kind of normative 
pressure we associate with them.
1 will begin by considering various approaches to the problem of freedom and 
responsibility. 1 will defend the view that there is a fundamental link between the idea 
that there are reasons that are “ objective” in the relevant sense, and the conditions 
under which we might consider an agent to be responsible. Ultimately, 1 will argue that 
responsibility requires that the agent bear the right kind of relation to such reasons.
With this aim in mind, 1 will go on to discuss what it might mean for reasons to 
be objective in the relevant sense, and to consider the kind of arguments that may 
make us sceptical of the claim that reasons could have the kind of objectivity required 
to support such a conception of responsibility. 1 will try to refute the view that all 
reasons claims have subjective conditions, arguing that we have good grounds to think 
that at least some reasons claims, in particular, moral obligations, cannot be plausibly 
explained in this way.
1 will go on to argue in favour of an alternative explanation of moral 
obligations, influenced by Mill and Strawson. This account emphasises the importance 
of considerations about the quality of the agent’s will towards others, and the way this 
relates to the kind of justification we might have for adopting certain attitudes towards 
an agent. This aspect of the account is also closely related to the idea that a system of 
moral norms can be considered to be objectively valid. 1 will build on this view of 
moral obligations in developing an account of the conditions of responsibility.
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This discussion will be divided into four chapters. Whereas the first two 
chapters will discuss responsibility and reasons quite broadly, and the debate 
surrounding these issues, the final two chapters will be focused primarily on developing 
and defending positive accounts of these phenomena.
In chapter one, 1 will discuss the basic problem of freedom and determinism. 1 
will focus on two prominent reason-based views of responsibility: those put forward by 
Susan Wolf and John Martin Fischer. 1 will look at Susan Hurley’s attempt to refute 
Wolfs view, and will try to show that Hurley’s argument fails, and that we have better 
reason to support an account of responsibility closer to Wolfs. Wolf associates 
responsibility with the capacity to respond to objective reasons.
In chapter two, 1 will defend the idea that there are objective reasons of the 
kind needed to support Wolfs account. 1 will focus, primarily on Williams’s argument 
against external reasons claims, since the kind of objectivity required to support Wolfs 
account involves a commitment to reasons that are external as Williams defines it. 1 
will argue that even if  we were to find Williams’s account plausible in explaining some 
reasons claims, it breaks down when we try to account for moral reasons. Moral 
reasons are the kind that matter most, since the really interesting questions of 
responsibility are those concerning moral responsibility.
The third chapter will support an alternative account of moral reasons, 
influenced by Strawson and Mill. On this account, the attitudes we are justified in 
adopting in response to facts about the quality of an agent’s will towards others are 
fundamental when it comes to understanding moral duties and explaining the 
normative pressure associated with them.
The final chapter will draw on these considerations in order to develop 
conditions of responsibility that not only take into account Wolfs insights, but also 
relate in a relevant way to features that are fundamental in explaining moral 
obligations. 1 will also discuss the relation between these conditions and those looked
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at in the first chapter, and will reconsider the question of whether we should consider 
responsibility to be compatible with determinism.
7
1 Reason. Determinism £t Moral Responsibility
In this Chapter, 1 will discuss the traditional problem of free will and 
determinism. That is, 1 want to consider (roughly) the thesis that all events, including 
our own actions, are determined by prior causes, and whether this thesis should be 
taken to pose some threat to the concept of free will, and in turn, to the concept of 
moral responsibility. 1 want to examine some of the ways in which theorists have tried 
to resolve this problem. 1 will focus on the kind of solution that involves appealing to 
the concept of reason to help ground the notion of responsibility in light of the threat 
we might take determinism to pose. 1 aim to defend one of these reason-based 
approaches against certain lines of argument that have been put forward against it.
1 will begin by discussing what we mean by the thesis of determinism, and 
exactly why this might be seen as a threat to the concept of freedom, and of 
responsibility. 1 will then look at various responses to this problem, starting with Harry 
Frankfurt’s argument that determinism should not be taken to threaten responsibility in 
the way we tend to suppose. 1 will then go on to discuss two prominent reason-based 
views of responsibility -  those put forward by Susan Wolf, and by John Martin Fischer.
Ultimately, 1 want to defend an account along the lines of that offered by 
Wolf. Susan Hurley draws on Frankfurt’s point in order to argue that we should reject 
Wolfs account in favour of Fischer’s. 1 hope to show that her argument fails. This is 
because it rests on an inference that commits a particular fallacy -  one outlined by 
Robert K. Shope, which he calls “ the conditional fallacy” .
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1.1 Freedom o f the Will
1.1.1 The Threat to Free Will
The phenomenon most notably taken to threaten free will is causal 
determinism; the idea that the laws of physics and the past are enough to provide a full 
explanation of why any event happened, including events such as our own decisions. 1 
will use the word “determinism” to refer to the following somewhat more precise thesis:
Determinism:
For any given time, a complete statement of the facts about that time, together 
with a complete statement of the laws of nature, entails every truth as to what 
happens after that time.
For the purposes of this discussion, 1 will not question the truth of this thesis, but will 
work on the assumption that it ’s true in order to examine the implications this has for 
the notion of responsibility1.
This thesis entails that our own actions and decisions are determined by factors 
entirely outside of our own control. They are already implied by events prior to our 
birth. If our actions were already determined prior to our birth, we might think this 
implies that we cannot make free decisions in the way we suppose we can. This, in
1 I t ’s worth noting that even if  we do not think that such a strong statement is true, we might 
take a slightly weaker thesis to threaten freedom and responsibility in much the same way.
Some theorists argue that the laws of nature are not always entirely deterministic in this way, 
but might be, to some extent, probabilistic. Thomas Scanlon points out that even this does not 
necessarily help us to resolve the threat, since our actions would still be the result o f causal 
influences outside of our control; it ’s just that they will affect us in a probabilistic rather than a 
deterministic way. (“Responsibility” in What we Owe to Each Other (Harvard University Press: 
1998) p. 250). To simplify matters, 1 will work with the straightforward determinism case in this 
discussion, focusing purely on its relevance to the issue of moral accountability, and not on its 
truth or falsity.
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turn, may lead us to conclude that we cannot justifiably be held responsible for our 
decisions. I f  the past and the laws of nature are enough to determine our actions, then 
given we cannot change either of these things, it seems it seems to follow that we can 
never do anything different to what we do in fact do.
The truth of determinism has been considered to be a threat to responsibility 
because it seems to imply that we are not able to do otherwise. It has generally been 
supposed that an agent can only be justifiably held responsible for her act on the 
condition that she is capable of doing otherwise, so if  determinism is incompatible with 
this condition being met, it ’s also incompatible with responsibility.
For this reason, the debate about whether free will is compatible with 
determinism has generally focused on whether the ability to do otherwise is compatible 
with determinism. Traditionally, compatibilists have argued that it is, and 
ineompatibilists, that it is not.
Compatibilists have, in the past, adopted a strategy known as the conditional 
analysis in order to argue that the ability to do otherwise is compatible with 
determinism. This involves a particular analysis of the following the statement:
(a) He could have done otherwise
It is argued that this should be analysed as being true on the condition that the 
following statement is true:
(b) He would have done otherwise, if  he had chosen to do otherwise.
If this analysis worked, then the ability to do otherwise would be compatible with 
determinism, because statement (b) is compatible with determinism. But the analysis 
fails. As Hurley notes, the ability to do otherwise requires more than just acting on a 
disposition that would have led you to act differently under conditions that do not
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obtain. It requires the outright possibility o f an alternate sequence o f events holding 
all else constant.
The conditional analysis fails because it does not distinguish features of the 
actual sequence from features of the alternate sequence. In assessing whether 
responsibility is compatible with determinism, we need to draw a distinction between 
actual sequence requirements for responsibility and alternate sequence ones. We need 
to know whether it ’s features of the actual sequence of events leading to the agent’s 
act that count, or rather that we need the outright possibility of an alternate sequence 
of events with certain features.
An example of an actual sequence requirement is the regression principle, 
which states that in order to be responsible for an action, the agent must be 
responsible for its cause. An example of an alternate sequence requirement is the 
principle that an agent can only be held responsible for her action on the condition 
that she could have done otherwise.
Conditional analyses involve only actual sequence principles, and these can 
never be used to ground an ability to do otherwise. But even if  the ability to do 
otherwise cannot be grounded in any actual sequence requirement, we might still think 
that responsibility can be. We can consistently maintain that some actual sequence 
principle provides a basis for responsibility, so long as we are willing to question the 
traditional assumption that ability to do otherwise is a condition of responsibility.
Harry Frankfurt devised a case that suggests this traditional assumption may indeed be 
mistaken.
1.1.2 Frankfurt's Case
Frankfurt rejects the claim that alternate possibilities are necessary for 
responsibility. There are many cases where the agent cannot do otherwise and is not
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responsible for their act, but this doesn’t mean that the agent is not responsible 
because they cannot do otherwise. It may be that some factor, such as the agent’s 
being coerced, would entail both of these things, but that there is no entailment 
between them. Normally it is the very same thing that stops the agent doing otherwise 
that also makes him perform his actual act. Frankfurt devises a case that involves no 
such presumption.
Black wants Jones to perform a certain action. He has a special device that will 
manipulate Jones’s nervous system and brain processes, making him perform the action 
in question. But Black is excellent at judging people’s intentions, and he will only 
bother doing this if  he judges that Jones is not going to perform the act of his own 
accord. As it goes, Jones does perform the act of his own accord, so there is no need 
for Black to intervene.
In this case, it seems Jones is responsible because he acted entirely for his own 
reasons. It seems irrelevant that he could not have done otherwise. Hurley puts this 
down to the “ irrelevant alternative intuition”.
If we accept Frankfurt’s argument, this opens up scope for accounts of 
responsibility that do not require any alternate sequence of events, but instead look 
only at features of the actual sequence of events leading to the agent’s act. In fact, it 
might be taken to not merely make such a strategy feasible, but to add a substantial 
amount of support to it. If alternate sequences which play no role in determining the 
agent’s actual actions are irrelevant in determining whether or not the agent can be 
held responsible, this means that principles which require the possibility of alternate 
sequences are equally irrelevant, and therefore only accounts that rest on actual- 
sequence requirements will do.
Hurley uses precisely this line of argument, based on Frankfurt’s irrelevant 
alternative intuition, in order to support Fischer’s reason-based view of responsibility,
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which rests only on actual sequence requirements, and to reject Wolfs reason-based 
view, which in some cases involves alternate sequence requirements.
In the following section, 1 will examine both of these reason-based accounts. It 
is with reference to the precise conditions developed by Wolf and Fischer that Hurley is 
able to use Frankfurt’s intuition to develop her argument, so we will need to look 
carefully at the conditions each of them offer. 1 will begin by looking at Wolfs view, 
and at the considerations she offers in support of it.
1.2 Reason Based Accounts o f Responsibility
1.2.1 Susan W olfs Account
Wolf compares three different models of responsibility: the Autonomy View, the 
Real Self View, and her own version of the Reason View, ultimately arguing for the 
Reason View. She analyses these as follows:
The Autonomy View
The Autonomy view is committed both to a regression principle and a eould- 
have-done-otherwise principle. It requires radical freedom; that the agent has ultimate 
control The agent’s decisions must not be causally determined, but at the same time 
must not be random and uncaused. The self must be able to endlessly account for 
itself and its behaviour.
The Real Self View:
The Real Self view, in contrast, does not require that responsibility is regressive 
in this way -  the regression stops with the agent’s system of values, or real self. So 
long as this is the source of the agent’s act, the agent is responsible. It does not matter
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where the Real Self comes from. Wolf rejects this because an agent may not be 
responsible for their system of subjective values. They may result from a bad 
upbringing. She argues that this confuses mere causal responsibility with deep moral 
responsibility.
The Reason View:
It is the ability to act in accordance with objective reasons (as opposed to your 
own subjective values) that is required for responsibility. This is the view favoured by 
Wolf.
According to the autonomy view, an agent who does the right thing for the 
right reason will not be praiseworthy unless she could do otherwise. Wolf argues that 
this is irrelevant. It ’s just the agent’s ability to act in accordance with reason that 
matters, not whether she is able to act irrationally instead. Wolf argues that in cases of 
praise the agent’s being able to do otherwise does not add to his status as a responsible 
agent. In fact, it might even detract from it.
On Wolfs account, it ’s a mistake to think that an absence of determinism is 
always required for responsibility. She looks at precisely what it would mean for an 
agent to be able to do otherwise in cases of moral praise. Either they would have to be 
able to act in ways that contradict their own values -  to act in spite of their values, or 
they would have to be able to be able to pick and choose their values. This would 
mean that those values could not possibly be based on the way things are, or on the 
agent’s capacity to discern the actual value of things, but would instead be based on 
the agent’s random whims.
Wolf argues that if  an agent were able to act in ways that contradict their own 
values, this would be insane. E.g. a mother who could watch her son dying without 
helping him despite the fact she could, and that she loves her son and wants him to 
live.
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Likewise, it would not help if  someone were able to be in control of their values 
to the extent that they could drop them at a whim. E.g. a man who loves and cares 
about his wife, but whose love for her is such that he could just choose to stop caring 
about her at any moment. To say the least, this would not add any praiseworthiness to 
the acts he performs on the basis of his love for her. Arguably, this would not even 
count as genuine love at all. A person who could choose either to neglect or ignore 
their values might not even be considered a moral agent.
Wolf argues that the main point is that an agent’s actions must be determined 
in the right way in order for the agent to be praiseworthy. It’s not that they shouldn’t 
be determined at all. An agent must be doing the right thing to some extent because it 
is the right thing to do. This does not require that the agent could do otherwise.
A bad upbringing does not stop a person being responsible in virtue of the fact 
it means their actions are determined; it does so in virtue of the fact that it means their 
actions are not determined by what reasons there actually are. Wolf reconstructs the 
conditional analysis as value-laden. An agent is responsible on the following condition:
He could have done otherwise, had there been good and sufficient reason to do
otherwise
In the case of praise, this condition is counterfactual, whereas in the case of 
blame it is not -  the agent acts as they do despite the existence of better reasons not 
to. At any rate, the key factor is not our ability to autonomously govern ourselves, but 
our ability to be determined by the true and the good, as opposed to being determined 
by a random and misguided set of values.
Wolfs account is asymmetric between praise and blame. I f  we do the right 
thing for the right reason, this a fortiori implies that we were able to, and so the 
condition is automatically met. No outright ability to do otherwise is required. I f  we
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do not do what reason requires, however, we cannot be held responsible unless we are 
capable of responding to reason. This does require the outright possibility of an 
alternate sequence of events.
It is this dependence on alternate sequenee-principles for cases of blame (in the 
face of Frankfurt-style cases) that Hurley takes issue with, and that leads her to favour 
Fischer’s account instead. Before going on to discuss Hurley’s argument, we need to 
look at Fischer’s model and at the way in which it differs from Wolfs.
1.2.2 John Martin Fischer's Account
Fischer’s reason-based approach is somewhat different to Wolfs. He 
distinguishes between different mechanisms on which an agent might act. An agent is 
responsible so long as in the actual sequence, the agent is led to her act on the basis of 
a mechanism that is reasons-responsive. No possibility of an alternate sequence is 
required.
Jones is responsible because he acted on a reasons-responsive mechanism. Had 
Black manipulated his brain, he would not have been acting on a reasons-responsive 
mechanism, so he would not have been responsible. But as it goes, Black did not 
actually manipulate Jones’s brain, so such a sequence of events is irrelevant to Jones’s 
responsibility.
Fischer distinguishes between strong and weak reasons-responsiveness. 
Following Hurley, 1 will use the terms “ tight” and “loose” reasons-responsiveness. A 
tightly reasons-responsive mechanism tracks reason in such a way that the same 
mechanism will always lead the agent to do what there is optimal reason to do. A 
mechanism is loosely reasons-responsive so long as there is some possible world (which 
need not be close to the actual world) in which there is reason to do otherwise, and the 
same mechanism operates, and leads the agent to act on that reason.
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Weak-willed agents often do not do the right thing, but would do if  there were 
slightly stronger reasons. Such agents will be responsible if  all we require is loose 
responsiveness, but not if  we require tight responsiveness. Fischer argues that tight 
reasons-responsiveness suffices for responsibility, but is not a necessary condition. An 
agent will still be held responsible despite some degree of weakness of the will.
Fischer’s account of responsibility in most respects parallels Robert Nozick’s 
truth-tracking account of knowledge. Nozick’s account states that further to having 
true justified belief that p, an agent will only know that p if:
(1) the agent would not believe that p if  p were not true (taking only nearby 
possibilities where p is false into account), and
(2) under various nearby conditions in which p were true, the agent would 
believe that p.
In other words, an agent has knowledge that p only if  he is able to discriminate the 
conditions that would obtain if p were true from those that would obtain if  p were 
false.
Stated in this form, where it ’s the capacity of the agent himself that counts, we 
run into problems. Nozick gives the following example:
A grandmother sees her grandson is well when he comes to visit; but if  he were sick or
dead, others would tell her he was well to spare her upset. Yet this does not mean she
doesn’t know he is well (or at least ambulatory) when she sees him2.
This example is an epistemological analogue to the Frankfurt case for 
responsibility. Nozick notes that this shows that making the conditions for knowledge
2 Nozick, Robert. (1981) “Knowledge and Scepticism” in Epistemology: An Anthology, ed. by 
Ernest Sosa and Jaegwon Kim (Blackwell: 2000), p. 82.
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agent-centred won’t do. What’s important is that we analyse the tracking capacity of 
the mechanism the agent bases her belief on. In the actual sequence the agent’s belief 
is based on a reliable (truth-sensitive) mechanism, so the agent has knowledge. Had 
her son died, she would not have based her belief on a truth-sensitive mechanism, but 
since this alternate possibility plays no role in the actual sequence of events leading to 
the agent’s belief, it ’s irrelevant.
For this reason we need a principle for knowledge that’s both actual-sequence 
and mechanism-centred. Fischer argues, for analogous reasons, that we need an actual 
sequence, mechanism-centred principle for responsibility.
Nozick’s truth-tracking account, however, requires that the mechanism track 
truth in the nearest possible worlds. This is roughly equivalent to tight reasons- 
responsiveness. Since Fischer only requires loose responsiveness, his account of 
responsibility is not exactly analogous to Nozick’s account of knowledge. He requires 
just that there is some possible world, which need not be close, in which the agent has 
reason to do otherwise and acts on that reason.
Fischer (along with Mark Ravizza) criticises Wolfs asymmetry account, arguing 
that the existence of Frankfurt-style cases disproves her claim that an agent must be 
capable of doing otherwise in order to be held responsible in cases of blame. Hurley’s 
argument against Wolf is aimed at establishing this kind of point. She argues that we 
can construct a thought experiment that proves it ’s possible to generalise Frankfurt’s 
irrelevant alternative intuition, showing that Wolfs requirements for cases of blame 
also regard factors that are irrelevant to whether we should hold agent’s responsible.
1.2.3 Susan Hurley's Analysis
Hurley develops her argument by carefully comparing Wolf and Fischer’s 
principles, and separating out the different features of each principle in order to devise
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cases in which we can assess independently the contribution being made by each in 
helping us to establish whether an agent should be held responsible for his act. She 
hopes to show that Wolfs alternate sequence requirement for cases of blame is 
irrelevant in much the same way as Frankfurt tries to show that the ability-to-do- 
otherwise principle is irrelevant in determining whether Jones is responsible.
Hurley notes three major differences between Wolfs account and Fischer’s. 
Firstly, whereas Wolf requires the outright possibility of an alternate sequence for 
blameworthy acts, Fischer requires just that the actual sequence has certain features. 
Secondly, Fischer only requires a loose link to reason. If he required a tight link, then 
those who did not act in accordance with reason would not be responsible. Finally,
Wolf requires the ability to respond to objective reasons whereas Fischer’s view on this 
is unclear. This comparison gives rise to three questions:
(1) Does the link to reason needed for responsibility impose alternate sequence 
demands, or can it be adequately characterised in terms of the dispositions of the 
mechanisms that operate in the actual sequence?
(2) Is the link to reason required for responsibility tight or loose?
(3) Is it a link to objective reasons, or will subjective reasons do?
Tight reasons-responsiveness, then, is maximal in two dimensions. We can see 
this when we take both Fischer’s distinction and Wolfs distinction into account. It can 
be weakened either by loosening it (as with cases of weak will) or by subjectifying it.
A deprived upbringing may mean an agent’s values are out of line with 
objective reasons. A person might act on a mechanism that tracks her subjective 
reasons very tightly, but due to her upbringing, these reasons are based on evil values 
(supposedly, there are no objective evil values). Such a person would be held 
responsible i f  we require only responsiveness to subjective reasons, but not i f  we require 
responsiveness to objective reasons.
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As well as maximal reasons-responsiveness, then, we also have three further 
categories. We have loose responsiveness to objective reasons, tight responsiveness to 
subjective reasons, and loose-responsiveness to subjective reasons. These varieties of 
reasons-responsiveness impose only actual-sequence demands. So long as the agent’s 
actual mechanism is reason-based, it does not matter whether the agent might have 
acted on some other mechanism instead.
For maximal reasons-responsiveness, however, it ’s very difficult to distinguish 
actual-sequence requirements for cases of blame from alternate sequence ones. If 
virtuous Vivian always acts on a maximally reasons-responsive mechanism, this entails 
that she will always do the right thing for the right reason. This a fortiori implies that 
she is able to do the right thing for the right reason. Likewise, if  an agent is not even 
capable of doing the right thing for the right reason, this implies that she is not acting 
on a maximally reasons-responsive mechanism.
However, Hurley notes that the implication does not run in the other direction. 
Salome may be fully capable of acting in accordance with reason, even though the 
mechanism she actually acts on is not reasons-responsive. There may be the outright 
possibility of her acting on a different, more reasons-responsive, mechanism instead. 
But, given the mechanism she does in fact act on, she would not do the right thing, 
even though she could do.
In cases where neither Fischer’s reasons-responsiveness condition or Wolfs 
ability condition are met, the agent will not be held responsible. But Hurley wants to 
work out which principle accounts for this. Is it that the agent is incapable of doing 
the right thing, or that her act results from an insufficiently reasons-responsive 
mechanism? Hurley suggests we compare cases in which neither condition is met with 
those in which the ability condition is met, but the responsiveness condition is not. We 
can then see if  the ability condition on its own is enough to make the difference.
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In Frankfurt cases it ’s supposed that the actual-sequence condition is met and 
the alternate one is not. For these principles, we can’t do this. If an agent meets 
Fischer’s actual-sequence requirement (maximal reasons-responsiveness), this implies 
that they have also met Wolfs alternate sequence requirement (ability to act on 
reason). Instead, Hurley argues that we can get to the irrelevant alternative intuition by 
separating the conditions the other way around. We suppose it ’s the actual-sequence 
requirement they fail, and the alternate-sequence requirement they meet, and then see 
how this compares to cases where they fail both requirements. If there seems to be no 
difference with regards to responsibility, then we will have shown that meeting Wolfs 
ability condition is irrelevant.
We need to look at examples where, given the mechanism she actually acted 
on, the agent would not do the right thing even /Tshe could have done, and then 
compare cases where actually she could have done with cases where actually she could 
not have done. If the actual causes of her act were such that she would not have done 
the right thing even if  she could have done, is it relevant whether or not it was 
possible? We can think about this in relation to the three cases in which an agent may 
fail to do the right thing: Loose reasons-responsiveness (such as weak-wili), 
responsiveness only to subjective reasons (such as evil values), and failure of reasons- 
responsiveness (as happens with psychiatric disorders). Hurley applies this thought 
experiment in all three cases.
Wilma is weak-willed -  she acts on a mechanism that is only loosely responsive 
to reason. She would not have done the right thing for the reasons there are, even if  
she could have (although she might have done if  there were slightly stronger reasons). 
Given she would not have done the right thing even if  she could have, is there a 
relevant difference between the case in which she could have, and the case in which she 
could not have? It seems that if  this is enough to make her responsible when there is 
an outright possibility of an alternate sequence, then it ’s equally sufficient when there 
isn’t.
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Ethel is dedicated to evil. If she is not causing any damage, it ’s because she 
thinks she can’t. If she thought she had the opportunity to do some harm, that’s 
exactly what she would do. She acts on a mechanism that tightly tracks her subjective 
desire to do evil. Given this, she would not have acted rightly even if  she could have, 
so would it make any difference to how responsible she is if  in fact she could have? 
Again, Hurley argues that the mere ability to do otherwise is irrelevant.
Maude is mentally ill. She acts on a mechanism that is not responsive to 
reason at all (so of course, she is not responsible for her actions). Because of this 
disorder, she would not do the right thing even if  she could. But if  there were the 
outright possibility of her acting on another mechanism, that was reasons-responsive, 
would this make her any more responsible? It seems once again that if  that alternate 
mechanism played no causal role in her actual actions, we cannot hold her responsible.
The important point in the above cases was that the agent would not have 
done otherwise even if  she could have done. For Frankfurt’s case there is an irrelevant 
alternative. The reason Jones could not have acted rightly was because Black was ready 
to manipulate his brain. Hurley argues that the irrelevant alternative intuition is just as 
valid in relation to determinism -  where the agent could not have done otherwise 
because of the laws of physics and the past. This does not mean that she would have 
done otherwise if  she could have done. Even if  determinism is true in this world, it 
might be that, given the mechanism she actually acts on, the agent would have chosen 
to do exactly the same thing had she inhabited a possible world where determinism is 
false.
Hurley’s question of whether an agent would have done otherwise whether or 
not she could have, relates closely to Frankfurt’s question -  whether the agent 
performed the act only because she could not have done otherwise. This is the basis of 
the irrelevant alternative intuition, and Hurley argues that this is equally valid in cases 
with no counterfactual intervener, where determinism stops the agent from being able 
to do otherwise.
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It is this argument, resting on the cases in which Hurley says we can justify 
claims of the form “she would not have done otherwise even if  she could have done”, 
when this claim is being made in relation to determinism, which 1 want to argue rests 
on a fallacy -  the claim that even if  we supposed the world to be indeterministic, the 
actual mechanism on which the agent acts would help us to understand what the agent 
would be likely to do in this counterfactual indeterministic situation. In the following 
section, 1 will try to spell out precisely why 1 think that this reasoning fails.
1.3 Hurley's Argument St Shope's conditional Fallacy
1.3.1 Hurley's Inference
Hurley’s account rests on the claim that in the above cases given the 
mechanism the agents actually acted on, they would not have done otherwise even if  
they could have done. The idea is that we can infer from what the agent actually does 
in an actual situation where the agent cannot do otherwise, what that agent would 
have done had they been in a counterfactual situation where they were able to do 
otherwise. 1 will argue that this inference is subject to what Shope calls “ the 
conditional fallacy”. 1 will begin by explaining where 1 think Hurley’s principle breaks 
down, and will then try to formulate precisely why 1 think it ’s subject to this fallacy.
She argues that just because in the actual world we could not have done 
otherwise, this does not entail that we would have done otherwise had we inhabited a 
possible world where determinism was false. This seems correct. What is problematic is 
her claim that it is possible to infer from facts about the actual mechanism, that the 
opposite is true: that the agent would have acted on exactly the same mechanism had 
she been able not to. I f  the first inference is not valid, neither is the second.
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In Frankfurt’s case there is a clear and simple answer to Hurley’s question of 
whether the agent would have done otherwise even if  he could have. But it ’s not at all 
obvious that the intuition can be generalised to the case of determinism, as it ’s not 
obvious that such a question can even be answered in the case of determinism.
In Frankfurt’s case, it ’s clear that Black’s merely being there on standby makes 
no difference to what goes on in the example. We can subtract Black from the 
example without this affecting Jones’s actions at all. But it ’s not at all obvious that we 
can subtract determinism, and still expect that events would unfold precisely as they 
would in a deterministic example. Hurley claims that in her examples, the agent would 
not have done otherwise even if  she lived in an indeterministic possible world where she 
could have done otherwise. It will help to examine exactly what this claim amounts to.
Examining this claim is made tricky by talk of deterministic and indeterministic 
possible worlds, as determinism and indeterminism are claims precisely about what is or 
is not possible, and so we end up with modal claims within modal claims. If we are to 
make sense of this at all, we will have to expand logical space by introducing higher 
order possible worlds. Purely to simplify terminology, we can call these higher order 
possible worlds “possible universes”. We can suppose there are only two possible 
universes: one in which determinism is true and one in which it is false.
The universe in which determinism is false will have a course of history that 
branches off into separate possible worlds at every point at which there is the outright 
possibility of an alternate sequence of events, keeping all else constant. As a result, the 
indeterministic universe will have near infinite possible worlds, whereas the 
deterministic universe will only contain the actual world (assuming determinism is true).
We can also suppose for simplicity that there were only two possible 
mechanisms the agent might have acted on: The one that leads her to do the wrong 
thing, and the one that leads her to do the right thing. So, What would it mean for her 
to have the outright possibility of acting on an alternate mechanism keeping all else
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constant? It seems we must say that had she been an inhabitant of the indeterministic 
universe, it would be equally outright possible that she would come to inhabit either of 
these possible worlds. There would be nothing stopping her from inhabiting one of 
these possible worlds over the other, and so it ’s an open question which mechanism she 
would have acted on if  determinism had turned out to be false. In such a universe, she 
might act on the mechanism that leads her to do the right thing, but she also might 
not.
1.3.2 The Conditional Fallacy
It ’s not at all clear that Hurley’s claim -  that given the mechanism on which the 
agent acted, she would not have done otherwise even if  she could have done -  could 
have any basis. If the agent’s being able to do otherwise entails that both the actual 
mechanism and the alternate mechanism are outright possible keeping all else constant, 
then it ’s not clear that there can be any single correct answer to the question of which 
mechanism she would act on if  she inhabited the indeterministic universe.
It may well be that there is no answer to the question of what an agent might 
have done had she been able to, because if  both the alternate sequence, where she acts 
on the responsive mechanism, and the actual sequence, where she does not, are 
outright possible, then there simply is no fact of the matter. But even if  we do not 
make as strong a claim as this, it is especially strange that Hurley tries to work out what 
that fact of the matter might be (if there is one) by looking at the dispositions of the 
actual mechanism on which the agent acts.
Looking at the dispositional features of the actual sequence’s mechanism won’t 
help us at all in working out what the agent would have done had it been possible for 
her to act on a completely different mechanism with completely different dispositional 
features. There is no reason why my acting on the mechanism that leads me to do the 
wrong thing would tell me anything about how likely it is that 1 would act on an
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alternate mechanism if  1 inhabited a universe where either course of events was 
possible.
It ’s true that given the agent acted on an insufficiently reason-responsive 
mechanism, then keeping that mechanism constant he would not have done otherwise 
even if  he could have. But Hurley’s examples can only be consistent both with passing 
Wolfs ability condition, and with failing Fischer’s responsiveness condition, if  the agent 
is able to act on a different mechanism altogether. This relies precisely on not keeping 
the mechanism itself constant. Wolfs condition will only be passed if  it ’s an open 
question which of the two mechanisms she actually acts on -  if  it ’s an outright 
possibility that she might act on the alternate mechanism.
Hurley’s inference from the dispositional features of the actual mechanism to 
her claim about what the agent would do had it been possible to act on an alternate 
mechanism cannot be valid. Even if  we could maintain that there is a fact of the 
matter about what she would have done had it been possible to act on a different 
mechanism, whether or not she would act on such a mechanism would not be in any 
way dedueible from the dispositional features of the actual mechanism she acted on.
So even if  there is an answer to Hurley’s question, there is no way to infer what it 
might be.
It might help to consider this in relation to one of her examples. 1 find it 
especially surprising that Hurley thinks in Maude’s case, we can tell from quite how 
mad her dispositions are now that she’s acting on the basis of a mental illness, 
anything about what choice she would have made had it been within her power to 
avoid having a mental illness in the first place, and had she been able to act on a sane 
mechanism instead. It’s hard to imagine how someone could genuinely be mentally ill 
i f  they were able to choose whether or not they felt like acting on a mentally ill 
mechanism, but we can imagine a scenario in which such a choice is made more 
plausible.
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We can imagine, for instance, that Maude was acting on a reasons-responsive 
mechanism, until one day she decided to take a tablet that she knew would temporarily 
give her extreme paranoid schizophrenia. She then kills someone, acting on a delusion 
that was induced by her mental illness. It seems that in this kind of a case, we do want 
to hold her responsible. Perhaps, however, we only hold her responsible because she 
was acting on a sane mechanism when she took the tablet. But it ’s hard to imagine 
any sane person would willingly take a tablet that left them with as dreadful a 
psychiatric disorder as schizophrenia.
So what if  we imagine that she did not have any choice in becoming mentally 
ill in the first place? It seems very strange to suppose that she would have chosen to 
become mentally ill even if  she could have avoided it. So in what sense would it be 
true that she would have done the exact same thing, had she been able to act on a 
different mechanism altogether? How could we infer from how mad Maude is now 
that she is mentally ill through no choice of her own, what she would have done had 
she been entirely able to avoid any mental illness in the first place?
It seems incredible to suppose that the dispositions of her schizophrenic 
mechanism would tell us anything at all about what she would do if  she had had the 
option of acting on a different mechanism with different (sane) dispositions. In fact, it 
seems overwhelmingly likely that there are some people who are currently suffering 
from schizophrenia (and thus acting on an insane mechanism), who would have been 
willing to take a vaccine to stop them becoming schizophrenic at all had one been 
offered to them before the onset of their illness. So it ’s just not true that had they 
been able to do otherwise, we can infer from the actual mechanism on which they are 
acting that they would not do otherwise, when doing otherwise would entail acting on 
some other mechanism.
Firstly, it seems in Maude’s case, that it would make a difference to how 
responsible she was if  she could have chosen not to act on a responsive mechanism 
instead. Secondly, it seems, given how unpleasant suffering schizophrenia is, that just
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because she actually suffers it, this does not imply that she would have chosen act on 
the same, schizophrenic, mechanism had she been able to avoid it.
It seems that Hurley’s inference commits version 2 of Shope’s conditional 
fallacy. Shope defines this as follows:
A mistake one makes in analysing or defining a statement p by presenting its truth as 
dependent, in at least some specified situations, upon the truth (falsity) of a subjunctive 
conditional 0  of the form: ‘I f  state of affairs a were to occur, then state o f affairs b 
would occur’, when...
...[Version 2) one has overlooked the fact that, in some o f the specified situations, 
statement p is actually true, but if  a were to occur, then it would be at least a partial 
cause of something that would make b fail to occur (make b occur).3
The following example should help to demonstrate that Hurley’s inference is 
subject to this fallacy:
The government of some country wants to keep its policy of making every 
individual do ten years of compulsory national service, but it also wants to give the 
impression that such policies are set in a very democratic way. However, as far as 
public opinion goes, everyone wants joining the army to be an entirely voluntary 
matter, and there is widespread outrage about the government’s refusal to change their 
policy in light of the enormous tide of public opposition to it. To get around this 
problem, the government change the law, and persuade the public that joining the 
army is now a voluntary matter. They then set up a secret operation whereby every 18 
year old who expresses their total unwillingness to ever do anything that might lead 
them to join the army is spiked with a sophisticated drug that will make them 
desperately want to spend at least ten years in the army.
3 Shope, Robert K. (1978) “The Conditional Fallacy in Contemporary Philosophy”, The Journal o f  
Philosophy, vol. LXXV, Number 8, pp. 399-400.
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Jim is one of these people who have been spiked with the drug, and the drug 
makes him act on a mechanism that is not reasons-responsive. It makes him 
desperately want to join the army despite the fact he has no good reason to. So given 
the dispositions of the mechanism that he is actually acting on, he would not refrain 
from joining the army even if  he could do.
On Hurley’s analysis, the statement “ given the mechanism on which he is 
acting, he would not have done otherwise” is analysed as being true on the basis of the 
conditional: “ if  he were able to act on a sufficiently reasons-responsive mechanism 
instead, he would not do”.
But she has overlooked the fact that if  Jim were able to act on a mechanism 
that was responsive to reasons, instead of acting on the basis of this drug, this would 
cause it to be false that he would not do anything other than join the army, since it 
would cause it to be false that he would act on this mechanism. He only wants to join 
the army because he is acting on this drug. If  he had been able to avoid acting on this 
drug to begin with, he would not have chosen to take the drug or to join the army at 
all. That is precisely why he had to be spiked with the drug in the first place: because 
he was unwilling to do anything that would ever lead him to join the army. Jim would 
never have acted on such a mechanism if  he had any choice in the matter.
It will help to clarify which elements of Hurley’s argument relate to which 
elements of Shope’s characterisation of the fallacy. Shope’s statement p corresponds to 
Hurley’s claim that because of the actual mechanism on which Jim acts, he would not 
have done otherwise. The conditional 0  is the claim that i f  state of affairs a occurs: If 
he could act on a mechanism whereby he refrained from joining the army, then state of 
affairs b would occur: He would not act on that mechanism and so would not refrain 
from joining the army.
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The fallacy occurs because he would only act on the mechanism that leads him 
to join the army on the condition that he has no choice in the matter. If he had been 
able to avoid it, he would have done. So if  a had been true, b would have been false.
Hurley claims that because of the actual mechanism Jim acted on, he would 
not have done otherwise (statement p). The truth of this statement is dependent on 
the claim (the conditional 0), that even if  it were the case that he could act on a 
mechanism that makes him refrain from joining the army (state of affairs a), he would 
not act on such a mechanism, and so would not refrain from joining the army (state of 
affairs b). However, Hurley has overlooked the fact if he could have acted on a 
different mechanism altogether -  one that would not make him join the army (if a were 
to occur), this would make it false that he would not refrain from joining the army 
(would make b fail to occur). B would only be true if  he were acting on the same 
mechanism he actually acts on. But if  a was true (he could avoid acting on the same 
mechanism) he would nofact on the same mechanism, and this would cause b to be 
false. (He would not act on that mechanism because he would never choose to do 
anything that would lead him to join the army).
It should be apparent that in cases like Jim’s, taking away the alternate 
possibility does make all the difference. Frankfurt’s case is, in important respects, 
different both to this case, and to the deterministic case, because (unlike the alternate 
possibilities in these cases) whether we add or subtract Black from the example is not 
likely to make any difference at all to the way that events unfold, given that it ’s already 
specified in the example that Jones’s actions are to be kept constant. In Frankfurt’s 
case we alter only the content of the alternate scenario, we do not alter how possible 
(or even probable) it is that it becomes the actual sequence. This is why Frankfurt’s 
alternative is an entirely irrelevant one, but the alternatives that would exist if 
determinism were false, are not necessarily irrelevant.
Wolfs account concerns precisely the kind of alternatives that are in question 
when we consider whether the agent’s decisions are causally determined. In such cases,
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she can hold on to her asymmetry between praise and blame, and she doesn’t have to 
argue that Jones is responsible in Frankfurt’s case, because this alternative is irrelevant 
in a way that indeterminism would not be. So in responding to Hurley’s argument, we 
also see that Fischer and Ravizza’s appeal to Frankfurt’s case to discredit Wolfs claim 
that alternate possibilities are required in cases of blame fails too.
1.3.3 Conclusion
It is not obvious that we can generalise the irrelevant alternative intuition to 
help us with the case of determinism, as it poses distinct problems to those accounted 
for in Frankfurt’s case. Hurley’s analysis brings these problems out more clearly. It 
does not help us to resolve them. For this reason, Wolfs account cannot be so easily 
discredited, and 1 think that her suggestion that responsibility requires the ability to be 
determined by objective reasons should be considered in more detail. In considering 
the other features of her account more carefully, we might become better equipped to 
answer the question of whether responsibility requires actual or alternate sequence 
principles.
We cannot answer this question with reference to Frankfurt examples alone. 1 
want to suggest, instead, that we should look carefully at what it is we take to be of 
moral significance when we make attributions of praise and blame, and why we 
consider it important for agents to respond to their moral obligations.
If we want to assess whether Wolfs account works, rather than considering its 
relation to Frankfurt’s case, we might want to look at the kind of metaethical claims 
that Wolfs account commits us to. It seems reasonable to suppose that a plausible 
account of responsibility should relate in some intelligible way to other fundamental 
issues concerning the rightness or wrongness of acts.
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The relation between responsibility, reasons, and objectivity plays a large role in 
Wolfs account. If we want to consider the plausibility of Wolfs conditions, we should 
at least be able to say something about how we take these issues to be important.
Over the next three chapters, 1 want to look at the role of reasons and 
objectivity in supporting W olf s account of responsibility, and at the kind of problems 
we encounter in trying to develop a plausible understanding these features. Having 
tried to formulate a good understanding of these issues and the distinct problems 
posed by them, 1 will then return to the specific issue of moral responsibility, and will 
consider what kind of an account of the conditions of responsibility we might end up 
with, taking these further conclusions into account.
In the following chapter, 1 will look specifically at the problem of how we could 
have objective reasons of the kind Wolfs account needs -  reasons that could apply to 
us regardless of our subjective desires. This claim is not an uncontroversial one, and 
there are various grounds on which other theorists have sought to reject it. 1 will try in 
the following section to address the kind of argument that is often given for this sort 
of conclusion, and to argue that there could exist reasons of the kind that Wolfs 
account requires, so long as we adopt the correct analysis of certain types of reasons 
claim.
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2 Rationality ft Responsiveness to Reason
The previous chapter was aimed at defending Wolfs Reason View against the 
kind of argument (put forward by Fischer and Ravizza, and more carefully by Hurley) 
that tries to discredit the account by drawing on Frankfurt cases and the “ irrelevant 
alternative intuition”. 1 tried to establish that such considerations in themselves are not 
enough to discredit her account.
Part of my reason for defending this particular account (or at least certain 
aspects of it) is that many of Wolfs insights into the issues surrounding attributions of 
responsibility seem to me to be especially valuable, and seem to take us a lot closer to 
the relevant considerations when it comes to accounting for our intuitions about 
responsibility. It allows us to distinguish quite accurately between the kind of cases 
where we think such attributions are justified, and the kind where we do not.
There seem to be two fundamental insights driving Wolfs account. Firstly, she 
does not think that freedom in itself is what we are concerned about in terms of 
accounting for responsibility, but rather that the agent needs to have the right kind of 
capacity for doing what’s right, hence the fact that we end up with an asymmetry 
between cases of blame and praise. If the agent manages praiseworthy action in the 
first place, then we already know that agent has the capacities necessary for it.
Secondly, Wolf is driven by the idea that we need some standard of judging what is 
objectively valuable in order to hold agent’s responsible for their actions.
In relation to this last point, Wolf often talks about “ the true and the good”. 
The idea that some act can independently have or lack value is considered a 
precondition for having any genuine basis on which to consider actions to be 
praiseworthy or blameworthy. It ’s often acknowledged in discussions of freedom and 
responsibility, that if  we lacked responsibility this might threaten our concept of moral
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values. But the fact that a lack of any independent basis for moral values might 
threaten the concept of responsibility is rarely discussed. On Wolfs account, the 
reasons we have for being moral in the first place are closely linked with the reasons we 
have for considering an agent to be blameworthy or praiseworthy for performing an 
act.
The importance we place on the agent’s reasons for doing the right thing in the 
first place seems to be a large factor in our holding that agent responsible for his act. 
The idea that responsibility naturally requires that there is a true and a good that 
agents are expected to respond to, seems to at least be a worthy suggestion, but also a 
controversial one. For both of these reasons, 1 think this aspect of Wolfs account 
needs to be considered in more detail. Although the idea has rarely been put forward, 
it seems a plausible supposition that our ability to account for whatever it is that 
grounds the goodness of an act should be important in terms of establishing why that 
act might be considered praiseworthy.
Furthermore, if  we can develop principles of responsibility that reflect a 
plausible understanding of why certain actions might have the value we attribute to 
them in the first place, we will have an account that actually relates to the kind of 
metaethical considerations that explain our reasons for doing the right thing to begin 
with. In this respect, our account of responsibility will also benefit from being more to 
the point when it comes to considering why an agent’s decision matters to us in a way 
that would lead us to make the kind of judgements associated with praise and blame.
In this respect, Wolfs account’s dependence on there being objective reasons 
for action seems to be a good thing. But such a claim is also controversial. It has 
often been argued that reasons simply are not the kind of thing that can be objective 
in the way that Wolfs view requires them to be. I f  the existence of objective reasons is 
going to be a fundamental part of the way we account for responsibility, then we 
should at least hope to show that reasons of this sort are able to exist at all.
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1 will try to defend Wolfs account against the kind of argument that’s 
sometimes put forward in favour of the conclusion that there could be no reasons that 
are “objective” in the sense that Wolfs account requires. 1 will focus on Bernard 
Williams’s famous discussion of internal and external reasons. 1 aim to defend what 1 
take to be the most significant aspects of Wolfs account in light of this kind of 
argument.
1 will begin by looking at exactly what the claim that we must be able to 
respond to objective reasons amounts to. 1 will then look at what grounds we might 
have for rejecting a theory that requires reasons of this sort.
2.1 Objectivity, Rationality Et Responsibility
2.1.1 Objective Reasons 6t Rationality
One immediate problem we encounter in trying to clarify exactly what it is to 
respond to objective reasons is that there is very little agreement among philosophers 
of precisely what constitutes a reason. The most basic feature we might expect a 
reasons claim to have, is well summed up by Thomas Scanlon, when he says that a 
reason should “ count in favour” of something4. Even this basic condition is not 
accepted on all philosophical accounts, but it should be uncontroversial enough that 
we can take it for granted for the purposes of this discussion. As soon as we get 
beyond this very basic feature, however, what we mean is likely to be significantly more 
debatable.
On some models, a reason is taken to be the kind of thing that we can cite as 
the cause of an agent’s actions (at least in conjunction with certain facts about the way 
humans operate). It ’s sometimes taken to involve means-end reasoning on the basis of
4 Scanlon, Thomas. (1998), “Reasons” in What we Owe to Each Other (Harvard University Press) 
p. 17.
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beliefs and desires. But we also think of reasons as the kind of thing that we could 
offer someone as advice, assuming that so far they are playing no causal role in 
determining their actions, and might never do so, in which case the force of such 
reasons is taken to lie just in the fact that we think they should be.
So reasons not only tend to have an explanatory role in making sense of a 
person’s actions from an outside perspective, but for the agent to whom they apply, we 
expect that reasons will have a certain kind of prescriptive or normative force. 
Acknowledging the existence of a reason is supposed to affect the agent’s motivations.
This is all consistent with Scanlon’s basic definition, but we might be tempted 
to think we can say more. It seems like what we have reason to do is explained by 
what course of action is rational for us. If we want to understand the significance of 
the claim that an agent must be capable of responding to objective reasons, we must, 
at the very least, look more carefully at the relation between reasons and rationality.
It seems like an obvious supposition, in light of the above considerations, that 
reasons are explained by rationality. We might suppose that if  some consideration 
counts as a reason for an act, this will be because of the fact that it is rational for us to 
perform that act. This seems to explain the kind of normative pressure we feel to shape 
our intentions in accordance with the reasons that exist.
This link between responding to reasons and being rational certainly seems to 
form a large part of the way that Wolf understands the force we take reasons to have.
In arguing against the view that we should require alternate possibilities as a condition 
for responsibility in cases of moral praise, she often asks about what it would mean to 
be “able to not do the right thing for the right reason”, and here she uses this phrase 
interchangeably with “able to act irrationally” . Likewise, she often uses the term “able 
to do the right thing for the right reason” interchangeably with “able to act rationally” . 
This indicates that she understands what it is to have a reason for some act in terms of 
what it means for a certain course of action to be rational for an agent.
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It seems reasonable to suppose then, that Wolf sees the force of reasons as 
being explained by what is rational. This is one claim we might want to consider more 
carefully in evaluating Wolfs account.
2.1.2 Reasons 8t Objectivity
So far, 1 have been talking about what it is to have a reason generally, and 
about how Wolf understands this. But it might seem like a more controversial or 
objectionable feature of Wolfs account is related, specifically, to the notion of having 
an objective reason.
Wolf defines “objective reasons” as implying “ ...the existence of non-arbitrary 
standards of correctness, standards which are independent of an individual’s will and 
even of an individual’s psychology as a whole, by which one can judge some actions, 
choices, ways of life, or systems of value to be better than others”5. This independence 
of the reason from the individual agent is the basis on which such reasons are 
considered to be objective.
As noted in the previous chapter, Wolf draws a sharp contrast between the 
Reason View and the Real Self View. She objects to the Real Self View on the grounds 
that merely being able to respond to your own subjective system of values is not 
enough to ground responsibility. In order for an agent to be responsible, her 
subjective values must also be determined by the true and the good.
In cases where an agent has a very bad upbringing, his subjective values and 
motivations might differ drastically from the true and the good. This might lead the 
agent to have subjective reasons that differ wildly from the actual reasons he is
5 Wolf, Susan. (1990) “The True and the Good” in Freedom Within Reason (Oxford University 
Press) p. 124.
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objectively subject to. E.g. given that an agent has evil values, this will give him 
subjective reason to perform actions tbat will cause barm, as this will best further those 
values that he actually accepts. Objectively, however, he will have no such reasons 
because this system of values itself is actually worthless. It does not coincide with the 
reasons there really are independently of any subjective aims or motives the agent 
might have.
2.1.3 The Cause for Objection to W olfs Account
In order to see why Wolfs claims might be considered controversial, it will help 
to get clear about what she is actually committed to. Her account seems to have two 
main threads to it. On the one hand, the force of reasons is explained in terms of what 
is rational for us, and on the other hand, reasons are considered to be “objective” in 
that they do not depend on the agent’s subjective aims or desires. So we have the 
following two claims:
(1) If an agent has a reason to act, this will be explained by the fact that such 
a course of action is rational for the agent.
(2) There are reasons for action that are objective in that they are independent 
of the agent’s subjective values.
On the face of it, it does not seem like there is any tension between these two 
claims, but this will depend on how we understand the term “rational” as applied to 
action. There is a plausible account of what it is for a course of action to be rational 
for an agent, spanning from Hume and defended by Williams, whereby a course of 
action will only be rational for an agent on the basis of certain subjective aims or 
values that agent already has.
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Specifically, Williams argues that an action is only rational on the condition 
that we have some subjective motive that would be furthered by it (in Williams’s 
terminology, if  there is a “sound deliberative route” leading from some aim or motive 
that the agent cares about to the conclusion that there is something to be said for 
performing the action).
If an action only ever counts as rational because of it ’s relation to the agent’s 
values, then clearly reasons cannot be objective (in the sense of being independent of 
the agent’s values) as well as being explained by what is rational for the agent. Yet 
Wolfs account seems to require both. Williams’s account requires that we give up 
claim (2). 1 want to suggest we give up claim (1) instead.
Ultimately then, 1 do not want to defend eveiy aspect of Wolfs account. But 1 
do want to defend a significant portion of it. In particular, 1 do think that 
responsibility requires objective reasons, and that there can be objective reasons in the 
sense that Wolfs account requires, i.e. an independent standard by which an agent’s 
subjective values can be assessed as good or bad. This objectivity, however, commits 
Wolf to reasons that are also “external” as defined by Williams. They do not depend on 
any subjective aims or motives the agent might have.
Williams argues that no reasons of this kind could possibly exist because the 
existence of such reasons would not imply that such courses of action were rational. If 
however, we do not think reasons are explained by rationality, this will not be a 
problem.
In the following section, 1 will look more carefully at Williams’s account of 
rationality in action, and at how he aims to establish that we could not have external 
reasons.
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2.2 Internal Et External Reasons
2.2.1 Williams's "Sub-Humean" Model
Williams’s view of practical rationality is much broader than the Humean model 
that it ’s taken to be an adaptation of. Hume only allowed practical rationality to cover 
instrumental means-end reasoning. Desires are not beliefs about matters of fact, and 
so cannot be judged in terms of how rational they are. Courses of action can only be 
considered practically rational insofar as they constitute a means to satisfying some 
desire the agent already has.
Williams’s model is based on this Humean model, although it ’s considerably less 
narrow with regard to what elements count as fulfilling the function of a desire, and 
with regard to what counts as reasoning about how to satisfy these elements.
Whereas Hume included only desires in the classic sense among those elements 
that could give rise to a motivation, Williams says that any elements in an agent’s 
“Subjective Motivational Set” (an agent’s “S”) can be the basis for a reason, and this 
can include “such things as dispositions of evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, 
personal loyalties, and various projects, as they may be abstractly called, embodying 
commitments of the agent”. He also adds, “Above all, there is of course no supposition 
that the desires or projects an agent have be egoistic; he will, one hopes, have non- 
egoistic projects of various kinds, and these can equally provide internal reasons for 
action”.6
Likewise, whereas Hume included only reasoning about the means to a given 
end that the agent desires, in terms of what could make it rational for an agent to 
perform some action, Williams argues that all we need is a “sound deliberative route”
6 Williams, Bernard. (1981) “Internal and External reasons” in Moral Luck, (Cambridge University 
Press) p. 105.
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leading from some element in the agent’s S to the conclusion that there is something 
to be said for performing the action, and he defines having a sound deliberative route 
very broadly.
He argues that “a clear example of practical reasoning is that leading to the 
conclusion that one has reason to <j> because 4>-ing would be the most convenient, 
economical, pleasant, and so forth, way of satisfying some element in S, and this of 
course is controlled by other elements in S, if  not necessarily in a veiy clear or 
determinate way. But there are much wider possibilities for deliberation, such as: 
thinking how the satisfaction of elements in S can be combined, for instance, by time- 
ordering; where there is some irresoluble conflict among the elements of S, considering 
which one attaches most weight to...or, again, finding constitutive solutions, such as 
deciding what would make for an entertaining evening, granted that one wants 
entertainment”7.
Williams is willing to allow for the fact that an agent may be unaware of the 
fact that some course of action will satisfy a desire, or the agent may only have certain 
elements in her S on the basis of false belief, and this may hinder her actual ability to 
deliberate to the proper conclusion about which acts there is something to be said for 
performing. Ignorance of these facts, or even ignorance about elements within the 
agent’s S (perhaps because some elements are in the unconscious), may mean the agent 
is unaware of the fact that a sound deliberative route exists. But i f  finding out certain 
truths would make the agent see that there is such a reason (so long as she deliberates 
rationally), we can say that there is a sound deliberative route, and it ’s just that she 
doesn’t know about it.
The main thread linking Williams’s view to Hume’s is his requirement that all 
genuine reasons claims will have subjective conditions -  and therefore that they will be 
internal reasons claims. An agent will only have a genuine reason to perform some act
7 Williams, Bernard. (1981) “Internal and External reasons” in Moral Luck, (Cambridge University 
Press) p. 104
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if  there is something that matters to him relative to which such an act is rational. So 
the agent’s having some element in his S; some desire, aim, motive, or value from 
which there is a sound deliberative route to the conclusion that there is something to 
be said for performing an act, will be a necessary condition of that agent having a 
reason to perform the act. So, any internal reason statement will be falsified by the 
absence of appropriate elements in the agent’s S.
2.2.2 The Sub-Humean Model Et the Falsity of External Reasons Claims
Williams argues that it ’s unintelligible to suppose that an agent has a reason to 
perform an act unless there is a sound deliberative route leading from some element in 
the agent’s S to the conclusion that there’s something to be said for performing that 
act.
He offers two considerations in support of this point. Firstly, he argues that we 
cannot explain the way reasons motivate us without supposing this kind of a rational 
relation between such reasons and elements in the agent’s S, and secondly, he argues 
that when this kind of rational link is lacking, to tell an agent that they have a reason 
to perform such an act amounts to mere browbeating.
Williams argues that external reasons theorists will have serious theoretical 
difficulties when it comes to explaining how it is that an agent comes to form new 
motivations in response to acknowledging a reason. If there is no appropriate element 
in the agent’s S that could rationally support such a motivation, it seems impossible to 
explain how that agent ever reaches the conclusion that there is something to be said 
for performing the act.
Williams expects that we might be tempted to think that coming to believe that 
an external reason statement is true will help explain an agent’s acquiring the new 
motivation, but he argues that this in /fse/fwill not explain anything.
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Williams asks “ What is it that one comes to believe when he comes to believe 
that there is reason for him to (|>, if  it not the proposition, or something that entails the 
proposition that i f  he deliberated rationally, he would be motivated to act 
appropriately?”.8 If this is what such an agent comes to believe, then on Williams’s 
view, this entails believing that there is some appropriate element in his S from which 
there is a sound deliberative route to the conclusion that there is something to be said 
for (J)-ing.
So in order for an external reason statement to explain how the agent forms a 
motivation, it must already be true that the agent has some appropriate element in his 
S of the kind that would justify an internal reason statement, and it would be this 
internal reason statement that was doing all the work in explaining why the agent 
came to form the motivation.
This point about motivation is one of the ways that Williams supports his 
position. The other is to argue that telling an agent that he has a reason to perform an 
act when he has no appropriate element in his S from which to deliberate to such a 
conclusion amounts to mere browbeating. To demonstrate this, Williams uses the 
example of Owen Wingrave.
Owen Wingrave’s father wants Owen to join the army, and insists that their 
long-standing family tradition of military honour is a reason for him to do this.
Despite knowing there is absolutely nothing in Owen’s S that would ever lead him 
through any amount of deliberation to join the army, his father insists on saying that 
this is what Owen should do.
8 Williams, Bernard. (1981) “Internal and External reasons” in Moral Luck, (Cambridge University 
Press) p. 109
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If it ’s true, as Williams argues, that we will not have any reason to perform an 
act, unless we have some basis in our S from which we can deliberate to the conclusion 
that there’s something to be said for it, then we would expect that telling someone to 
pursue a course of action for which there is no basis in their S would amount to mere 
browbeating. The case of Owen Wingrave serves to confirm that this is precisely how 
such a situation strikes us. Owen’s father isn’t appealing to anything that Owen can be 
expected to respond to in virtue of being rational and understanding the relevant 
considerations. Given this, it just seems plain false to suppose that Owen should join 
the army.
This example has some obvious flaws. It involves an entirely implausible 
reason, and so we might think it ’s the fact it ’s implausible, rather than the fact that it ’s 
an external reason, that accounts for its falsity. Supposedly this will not be the kind of 
thing that external reasons theorists have in mind. 1 will later discuss whether using a 
more plausible reason would make the browbeating claim lose its force.
2.3 External Reasons, Values Et Moral Obligations
2.3.1 Supporting External Reasons in Light of Williams's Argument
It seems that if  we are going to accept these arguments, and accept Williams’s 
claim that such considerations do support his main point (that all genuine reasons have 
subjective conditions) we will also need to accept some background assumptions.
Firstly, we have to suppose that it ’s not possible for an agent to form new 
elements within the S on the basis of rational deliberation. There is an assumption 
(spanning from Flume) in Williams’s argument that desires are the kind of thing we are 
merely subject to, and cannot be assessed in terms of how rational they are.
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Secondly, we must assume that we will not have a reason to perform any act, 
unless that reason is explained by the fact that it is rational to perform that act. We 
could not have a reason to perform an act on any basis other than the fact that such a 
course of action is rational.
We might, however, have grounds for rejecting both of these assumptions. To 
see why this is so, it will help to consider some of the points raised by Scanlon in his 
discussion of Williams’s argument.
Scanlon points out that Williams is willing to concede that an agent whose S 
fails to support certain reasons may be justifiably subject to a range of criticism, so 
long as we do not accuse such a person of irrationality.
Williams says: “There are of course many things that a speaker may say to one 
to is not disposed to <j> when the speaker thinks that he should be, as that he is 
inconsiderate, or cruel, or selfish, or imprudent; or that things, and he would be a lot 
nicer if  he were so motivated. Any of these things can be sensible things to say. But 
one who makes a great deal out of putting the criticism in the form of an external 
reason statement seems concerned to say what is particularly wrong with the agent is 
that he is irrational. It is this theorist who needs to make this charge precise: in 
particular because he wants any rational agent, as such, to acknowledge the 
requirement to do the thing in question”.9
Scanlon points out that if  we can justifiably aim any criticism at the agent at 
all, we will be implying that their failure to respond to a particular reason is a 
deficiency on the part of that agent (albeit a non-rational deficiency). I f  failing to see 
something as a reason is a deficiency, this implies that it is genuinely a reason. If no 
reason actually existed, we would have no justification for considering a person to be 
guilty of any kind of a deficiency when they fail to respond to it.
9 Williams, Bernard. (1981) “Internal and External reasons” in Moral Luck, (Cambridge University 
Press) pp. 110.
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Having established this, Scanlon infers that even Williams himself must be 
committed to the claim that any agent who does not see certain considerations as a 
reason is deliberating in a faulty manner. Just taking into account the fact that we can 
criticise an agent for failing to see something as a reason, we can establish that it is a 
reason, and from this we can conclude that if  an agent fails to see it as a reason, they 
cannot be thinking about the matter correctly.
But even given that an agent who does not see some consideration as a reason 
must be subject to faulty deliberation, we still have a problem when it comes to 
working out what it is that the agent is expected to deliberate from in order to reach 
this conclusion. Scanlon points out that Williams allows that the process of 
deliberation may affect the contents of an agent’s S in various ways. We can imagine 
that a man who is bored on his weekends has a reason to take up some kind of an 
interest, and that this would then give rise to various other aims and desires that he 
lacked before. To some degree then, even on Williams’s view there is a commitment to 
the claim that the elements contained in the S can be subject to rational deliberation.
Given this, Scanlon points out that if  Williams is willing to say that a person is 
deliberating wrongly who fails to reason from some element in the S to the conclusion 
that there is something to be said for performing some act, it seems odd that he is not 
willing to accuse an agent of defective deliberation if  the reason they do not pursue 
some course of action is because they fail to learn to value of it the first place, given 
that they do have an independent reason to value it (which they must do i f  any 
criticism against an agent who fails to see the value in such things is justified).
2.3.2 Reasons ft Value
It seems true that if we can criticise an agent on the grounds that his S does 
not support some reason, and if  such criticism is going to be justified, we might think
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this implies that there is genuinely a reason to perform the act. However, the fact we 
are justified in calling someone “unpleasant” or “ cruel” or “ inconsiderate” does not 
necessarily imply that there is any genuine reason for that agent not to be any of these 
things. It ’s merely the fact that such terms are considered critical o f the agent that 
implies that they are genuine flaws, rather than merely features of that agent we 
personally dislike (in the same way we might dislike their height). Williams might not 
accept this, but 1 take it that most of us will find it harder to deny that such features 
are genuine flaws in a person’s character.
Scanlon’s argument begins just with the assumption that there is something 
that’s actually valuable about not being inconsiderate, cruel or selfish. There is at most 
a veiy weak supposition that this is because it ’s irrational to be cruel, inconsiderate or 
selfish.
In the following section, 1 will argue that the attempt to ground these kinds of 
values in some concept of rationality is a step that we do not need to take in order to 
get around Williams’s argument.
1 will try to offer a way of supporting the claim that there can be objective (and 
thus external) reasons. But 1 will do this only at the expense of one of the claims that 
seemed to be playing a large role in Wolfs account -  the claim that the force of such 
reasons can be directly explained by which courses of action are rational for an agent.
1 want to argue that the relation between rationality and certain reasons claims will 
have to be construed as more complex than this.
This particular construal of the relation between rationality and reasons that we 
find in Wolf does not seem to play any important role in supporting her account of 
responsibility. That depends just on there being objective reasons, and we can accept 
this claim without having to buy into the claim that reasons are always explained by 
what is rational.
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We could get around Williams’s argument, even if  we accepted that agents only 
have reasons based on their ability to rationally deliberate to some conclusion in favour 
of performing an act. We could do this by arguing that we could rationally deliberate 
to conclusions about what it is we should value to begin with.
This is a possible approach, but it ’s not one 1 want to attempt. 1 think it ’s at 
best very difficult to sustain the claim that we have rational deliberative control over all 
of our motives, aims and desires. 1 don’t intend to say anything that would rule this 
claim out, but 1 don’t need to support it either. For the purposes of this discussion, 
then, 1 will simply take for granted Williams’s view that we cannot expect all genuinely 
rational agents to have the correct motives to begin with.
Williams’s argument also rests on our assuming reasons are always explained by 
what is rational for an agent. This would entail that if  there were objective reasons, all 
rational agents would be motivated to respond to them. However, 1 want to reject the 
claim that reasons are always explained by what is rational. Without this claim, 
Williams’s argument breaks down. My motive for rejecting this claim is that 1 think 
there are certain reasons for which such an explanation is not plausible.
2.3.3 Reasons, Rationality Et Moral Duties
1 want to argue that whilst Williams’s view might be plausible in accounting for 
some reasons, there are others that it does not seem to account for convincingly. Some 
reasons do seem to depend on the agent having particular motives that bear a certain 
rational relation to some end. But it also seems there are nonetheless cases where 
without any such motives we do still think that the agent has a reason.
It will help to look at the different grounds on which we might find Williams’s 
account implausible. In doing this, we might gauge a better idea of where the account 
derives its plausibility and what the limits of this are.
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On the one hand, we might think that the whole notion of rationally 
deliberating on the basis of the contents of the agent’s S seems to involve a lot more 
cognising about means and ends then we ever generally do when we are thinking 
about what reasons we have. An agent might see the fact that his library card has 
expired as a reason to renew it, and he might consider it a reason without ever 
introspecting about the contents of his S in order to determine whether he genuinely 
has any motives in light of which such an action would be rational.
The problem is, whilst this may show that there is some problem with the 
requirement that we are aware of a sound deliberative route from some element in the 
S, it does not seem to undermine the claim that (whether we think about it or are 
aware of it or not) it will only be true that we have a reason to renew the library card 
on the condition that we have some element in the S that would be furthered by this.
To say that an agent will only have a reason on the condition that he has some 
appropriate element in his S is not to make a very bold claim -  it does not say anything 
at all about what that agent will actually consider whilst he decides what he has reason 
to do. It just means that if  there really is no such element, then the reasons claim will 
be false. E.g. if  he does not wish to return to the library, has no commitments to any 
other institution he cares about that require him to have an up-to-date library card, 
does not value the abstract possibility of library access in any way, and/or has two 
hours to live and more important things to do than read, etc., this does plausibly falsify 
any claim about him having a reason to renew his library card, and this seems to show 
that such conditions really are necessary for the existence of this kind of reason.
If every basis we could possibly imagine within the agent’s S that would make 
such a course of action rational was lacking, it seems that it would be true that the 
agent has no reason to renew his library card. None of this involves making any claims 
at all about what the agent is likely to actually think about when he is deciding what 
he has reason to do.
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The claim that having some appropriate element in the S is a necessary 
condition of having a reason for a given course of action, and therefore that the 
absence of any such element will falsify a reasons statement, seems to me to be 
plausible and weak enough that it ’s difficult to deny it for many cases. 1 cannot help 
but find this very plausible for the above case, although 1 am sure there are theorists 
who don’t even find it plausible for this example. 1 personally find that surprising, but 
at any rate, 1 do not intend to discuss the issue of why even in this case some people 
might not be convinced. This is because 1 am not worried about what plausibility it 
may or may not have for this kind of case, because 1 don’t think that it maintains its 
plausibility for every case, even when understood weakly as just a claim about the 
necessary conditions for having a reason.
The cases in which 1 think the explanation breaks down, in particular, are cases 
involving moral reasons.
2.3.4 Moral Reasons
Scanlon offers the example of an agent who is cruel to his wife, and is 
surprised that Williams holds a view that involves claiming that such an agent will only 
have reason to treat his wife better if  there is something he values in light of which it 
would be rational to do so. He argues that this would force us to the conclusion that 
our own reasons for refraining from being cruel to our spouses are also based on 
subjective conditions, and that this rings false.
The important point in this case, that we might think was lacking in the library 
card case, is that it seems to ring false that such an agent has no reason to treat his 
spouse better regardless of what elements we suppose his S to contain.
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Whereas in the library card case, when we imagine that all subjective conditions 
are lacking, it seems impossible to deny that this falsifies the reasons claim, this doesn’t 
seem to be true in the current case. We can imagine that he does not like his wife very 
much, that he does not value being kind to people, that he enjoys treating her with his 
current level of cruelty, and that he is pretty certain that she’s now too emotionally 
weak to ever phone the police and file a complaint or anything like that, etc. Whilst 
this might make us predict that it ’s unlikely he will start to treat his wife better, none 
of this seems to make us conclude that there is really no reason for him to treat his 
wife any better.
In this kind of case, it ’s Wolfs claims that seem to accord especially well with 
our intuitions. Our inclination is precisely to think that even if  he has subjectively 
based reasons to be cruel to his wife, this would not show that he has no reason to 
treat her better; it would simply show that he has reason to reject his subjective system 
of values. Any equivalent claim we might be tempted to make for the library card case 
would be completely implausible, llnlike with the case of not being cruel to our 
spouses, we think that the reasons we have for renewing our library cards are 
completely exhausted by considerations that depend on our subjective aims and 
motives.
It seems that the main difference between these cases is that one of them 
involves a moral duty. We do not tend to think that what we have a moral obligation 
to do is determined by our subjective motivations in the same way as other reasons are. 
Whereas we tend to think that a claim about our having reason to buying a new 
television would be falsified by a total lack of subjective conditions, we do not think 
that our reasons for not mugging old ladies would be. If  we do not care about the 
welfare of other people, this will not indicate that we don’t have a reason; it will 
indicate that we are not acknowledging the reasons we have.
Furthermore, whereas telling a person who has no basis in his S that he should 
renew his libraiy card or join the army might seem like mere browbeating, we do not
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think that telling an agent she should stop abducting people at gunpoint and keeping 
them as prisoners in the attic counts as browbeating in the same sense. I f  an agent is 
in the habit of holding innocent victims hostage in the attic for her own amusement, 
we would not ask her to rethink this policy because we think such acts might not be 
rationally supported by her subjective values. We just think it ’s wrong full stop, 
whether or not she values anything that would lead her, in virtue of her rationality (or 
anything else for that matter), to think it ’s wrong.
1 would also like to argue that we do not think such actions are wrong because 
we think they are irrational. We need not claim that every rational agent will respond 
to such considerations purely in virtue of being rational. We might just think that the 
very fact it ’s morally wrong (irrespective of whether it ’s rational) is a reason -  and one 
that’s there objectively -  whether or not anyone cares about this fact. This indicates 
that we think there is something more that accounts for the force of moral obligations.
If we think that an internalist perspective on reasons works for most reasons 
claims, but breaks down when we think about moral reasons, we will nonetheless have 
established that there are objective reasons of the kind Wolfs account requires for 
responsibility, for the cases that are arguably most interesting and important. We will 
be able to formulate a good account of moral responsibility.
2.3.5 Moral Obligations £t Rationality
Ultimately, 1 will try to argue that the difference between the case of moral 
reasons and the case of non-moral reasons is to do with the fact that the normative 
force of reasons claims is best explained differently in the moral case to the way it is 
best explained in most10 non-moral cases. To the extent that we might think it relates
101 say “most” non-moral cases because we might think that we have obligations that do not 
rest on moral considerations. E.g. we might think we have reason not to destroy great pieces of 
art, even if  no one would know about it or be hurt or upset because of it. This equally will rest
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to rationality, it certainly does not relate in the same way we might take other reasons 
to.
Most of the things we consider ourselves to have reason to do are not driven by 
moral considerations, and so we tend to think that such reasons are based on what is 
rational alone. Furthermore, it seems likely that however we understand the notion of 
rationality, we consider it to be what is rational that determines most of the reasons we 
have, rather than vice-versa. But the case of moral reasons is different. We think that 
the moral wrongness of an act is a consideration that imposes normative pressure on us 
in a way that’s largely unrelated to the kind we associate with thinking about whether a 
certain course of action is rational given various aims or desires we have.
Part of the problem with Williams’s argument is to do with his assumption that 
we will not have a reason for action unless there is this particular kind of rational 
pressure to comply. This relates to his supposition that there is no sense in which we 
might say that someone has a reason, and not mean by this that it might play some 
direct role in explaining that person’s motivations. This leads him to assume that 
anyone who wants to defend external reasons will want all rational agents to respond 
to the requirement in question purely in virtue of being rational.
If this is what we want to claim, then we probably do have a problem when it 
comes to explaining how an external reason statement all on its own is going to give 
rise to the right motivation, since such a claim implies that acknowledging the reason 
and thinking about it rationally will automatically provide the motivation we are 
looking for. But if  we do not want to make this kind of claim, we do not run into this 
problem. We do not have to suppose that the mere existence of a reason implies that
on thinking that art can be objectively valuable in some respect. Whether or not this kind of 
case is plausible is largely outside of the scope o f what 1 want to discuss, but it ’s worth noting 
that nothing 1 have said should rule out the possibility of objective aesthetic values of this kind 
counting in a similar way to moral values.
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any rational agent will necessarily be motivated to comply with it, and we can still 
maintain that such a reason exists.
This is a very important point when it comes to considering exactly how we 
might think the notion of rationality actually relates to moral normativity. There are 
various ways we might define the concept of “rational” , but i f  we think that some 
consideration can motivate all rational agents in virtue of their rationality alone, and 
we think that it ’s in this sense moral reasons depend on rationality, we will have to do 
a lot of work in order to avoid falling prey to Williams’s criticism.
Once we have moved from the problem of reasons claims more generally to the 
specific issue of moral reasons, this problem of how an external reason can give rise to 
a new motivation for any agent purely in virtue of their rationality is often 
conceptualised as the problem of how we can explain the force of moral reasons in 
such a way as to convince even an amoralist who does not care about morality, just in 
virtue of their rationality alone. If, however, we do not think that the normative force 
of rationality directly explains the normative force of moral reasons, we have no reason 
to require that anything like this is possible. We can say that any moral person would 
respond to a consideration in virtue of being moral, without saying that every rational 
person would respond to it.
At this point, it might be useful to mention some considerations on this subject 
raised by Joseph Raz, in his discussion of Frankfurt’s writing on respect. Frankfurt 
argues that we should treat people with respect, rather than treating them equally, in 
the sense that we should only discriminate between them on grounds that are relevant. 
Fie notes that this seems to be a rational requirement, but that it can’t be important 
just for that reason, since acting irrationally, does not imply acting immorally.
Raz argues that we might consider it irrational to fail to treat someone with 
respect purely on the basis that we consider it irrational to fail to act on an undefeated 
reason, and we have an independent moral reason to treat people with respect. In this
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case, he points out that it will be true that we could accuse someone of irrationality 
when they fail to act on such a reason, but to do so would, if  nothing else, completely 
miss the point. The basis we have for criticising someone is independent of any 
irrationality they might also be guilty of as a result, since the force of their reasons for 
treating others respectfully is not itself explained by the fact it would be rational. 
Instead, the fact they would be acting irrationally by failing to do this would be 
explained by the fact that it ’s wrong, not vice-versa.
Clearly, moral reasons are associated with a normative pressure to respond, and 
so are reasons that arise purely out of rational concerns (such as means-end reasoning 
or good belief-forming practice). But the demands of morality do not seem to get their 
force in virtue of the demands of rationality. Clearly there is normative pressure to 
comply with our moral obligations, but we will have to explain this pressure in some 
other way. We cannot explain why it ’s important not to be cruel to our spouses using 
the same considerations that would explain why we have a reason to renew a library 
card.
In the following chapter, 1 will attempt to make clear precisely where 1 think the 
force of moral reasons claims lies. In doing so, 1 will try to work out exactly where the 
boundaries are between performing an action because it is rational to do so, and 
performing an action because of a moral duty to do so.
The account 1 wish to defend is broadly Millian, in that it involves drawing a 
link between the ways in which people would be justified in responding to an act and 
the reasons we have for performing or that act. This account does not entirely divorce 
the notion of moral reasons from that of rationality, but it is nonetheless consistent 
with accepting some of the persuasive anti-rationalist points that span from Humean 
theory, which have influenced some of the considerations that have been the focus of 
this chapter.
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Taking into account the conclusions of this chapter, and applying this to Wolfs 
account, we end up with a model where responsibility rests on ability to respond to 
objective reasons, but unlike on Wolfs account, we do not take those reasons to be 
directly explained by rationality. In the following chapter, 1 hope to support an 
account of the way we should explain the force of moral reasons that relates in a more 
direct way to the justifications we might have for the kind of attitudes we associate 
with blame and praise. As mentioned earlier, if  we can do this, the idea that 
responsibility relates to reasons will seem significantly more to the point when it comes 
to accounting for moral responsibility and it ’s significance.
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3 Moral Obligations. Reason &  Normativity
1 will now try to clarify how the current points fit in with the overall aims of 
this discussion. 1 began by trying to support Wolfs Reason View of responsibility, and 
by noting that it cannot be discredited as easily as some theorists have thought. But 
this view does rest on certain claims that might be considered objectionable on other 
grounds. It’s committed to the existence of objective reasons.
For reasons to be objective, they must be independent of an agent’s subjective 
values and desires. Williams argues that reasons of this kind cannot exist. It seems, • 
however, that Williams’s argument only works on the assumption that all reasons are 
directly explained by rationality. He supports this assumption by noting that if  
someone lacks the right kind of a rational basis for a reason, we cannot explain how he 
comes to be motivated by it, and telling him to act on it amounts to browbeating.
For many types of reasons claim this might seem plausible, but for moral 
reasons this explanation breaks down. Unlike with other kinds of reason, if  we think 
someone has a moral duty to do something, we need not suppose they will be 
motivated by their mere acceptance of this fact, and it does not seem to be 
browbeating in any relevant sense when we tell someone to acknowledge a moral 
obligation.
But this means we drop the assumption that reasons have their normative 
significance in virtue of considerations about what is rational for an agent to do. We 
need to suppose that the force of such reasons is explained by something else.
In this chapter, 1 will argue that we can account for the force of moral reasons 
in terms of considerations about the kind of attitudes that seem appropriate in 
response to certain acts. If we explain moral reasons in this way, we will have an
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explanation that’s much more to the point when it comes to understanding why we 
might suppose there is the kind of close link between reasons and responsibility that we 
find in Wolfs account.
The considerations in this chapter, should relate the way we explain moral 
reasons claims directly to considerations that are relevant to the issue of responsibility. 
This would not be possible if  we wanted to explain reasons in terms of which courses 
of action are rational for an agent. This is because the kind of normative significance 
we associate with moral duties seems to support certain attitudes in response to certain 
acts, and this fact cannot be accounted for with reference to what actions are rational 
from the agent’s perspective alone.
1 hope to show that once we start to think of moral reasons in this way, we will 
be better equipped to return to the initial problem of freedom and responsibility, and 
to evaluate precisely what it is that accounts for the important role reasons seem to 
have in supporting an account of responsibility. We will then be able to reconsider the 
significant points that are driving Wolfs account, and to develop principles of 
responsibility that reflect both the significant aspects of Wolfs account, and the 
important aspects of the broadly Millian View of moral reasons that 1 will defend in this 
chapter.
3.1 The Normative Force o f Moral Obligations
3.1.1 The Millian Approach to Moral Normativity
Although the discussion so far has been largely anti-rationalistic when it comes 
to explaining the force of moral obligations, there are aspects of the Millian-influenced 
view 1 want to defend that might seem to fall within the broadly rationalistic tradition. 
M ill’s argues:
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“We do not call anything wrong unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be
punished in some way for doing it; if  not by law, by the opinion of his fellow creatures;
if  not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience”."
1 mean to take this claim in a weaker sense than the way Mill might have 
understood it himself. There are certain attitudes that we may think are importantly 
linked with the idea of moral wrongness, and also with the idea of moral responsibility. 
The appropriateness of those attitudes seems to be part of what explains the normative 
pressure associated with moral duties.
The attitudes 1 have in mind are those that P. F. Strawson calls “reactive 
attitudes”. These are the kinds of attitudes that characterise the overall system of 
interpersonal demands and expectations involved in human interaction. These include 
feelings such as resentment, gratitude, remorse, reciprocal love, and hurt feelings. 1 
want to consider what the difference is between the times in which we would consider 
such attitudes to be appropriate, and the times in which we would not.
Strawson takes reactive attitudes to be fundamental both to our sense of 
humanity, and to our understanding of moral responsibility and what’s required for it. 
The concepts of moral praise and blame are closely tied up with the kind of reactive 
attitudes we associate with people’s different responses to the morally relevant claims 
of others. They are generally considered to be reactions to the quality of a person’s will 
towards ourselves and others.
In relation to such attitudes, it seems there is a sense in which certain 
emotional responses can count as rational or irrational. Although we might think that 
we cannot accuse someone of irrationality for failing to feel an emotion that they 
would have: some justification for, we do tend to think that we can accuse someone of 
irrationality when they respond with an emotion that’s entirely unjustified. So whereas, 
if  an agent simply fails to feel resentful when they have been deliberately and
" Mill, John Stuart. (1861) “On the Connection Between Justice and Utility” in Utilitarianism 
(Everyman: 1910) p. 50
59
maliciously wronged, this might not justify a charge of irrationality, we do think it ’s 
irrational to feel resentment towards someone for something that is not their fault.
The sense in which we might consider Mill to be correct then, is in the 
suggestion that we do not think that an act is an act of wrongness unless we think that 
other people, or the agent herself, would not be considered irrational for feeling the 
appropriate negative reactive attitude. This condition would supposedly only be met if  
was some justification for the attitude in question. To this extent, there is a clear link 
between the concept of rationality and the concept of moral rightness and wrongness.
The main difference between the sense in which rationality relates to our 
reasons for being moral on M ill’s view, and the way in which we might suppose them 
to relate on more classically rationalistic approaches, is that it involves considering what 
it would be rational for other people to feel in response to our act, and seeing a 
relation between the fact that an act is wrong and the fact that such feelings would be 
rational, but it does not imply that our own reasons for responding to this fact are 
explained by our being rational agents.
We can perfectly well imagine that an agent is not disposed to meet their moral 
duties purely because they do not care about the fact that certain reactive attitudes 
would be justifiable in response to their actions. We might nonetheless think the very 
fact that such attitudes are justified implies that there is (objectively) a reason to meet 
that obligation. We can suppose this to be true without suggesting that the agent in 
question, purely in virtue of their rationality, will be motivated by this fact.
So we can accept the kind of link between rationality and morality being drawn 
by Mill without supposing that all rational agents will be moral in virtue of their 
rationality alone. This means we do not fall prey to Williams’s criticisms and we can 
consistently acknowledge certain significant points made by Hume that we would 
otherwise have to reject (1 will come back to this point).
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We may well suppose that our victim would have a good justification for their 
feelings of resentment towards us, and even that we ourselves would have some 
justification for feeling remorse, and none of this implies that we will care just in virtue 
of the fact we are rational. We may not be responsive to the feelings of others or to 
the validity of their reasons for having such feelings, and whilst this will be a ve?y 
serious deficiency, this Millian account does not imply that this will necessarily be a 
deficiency in our rational capacities. We can accept M ill’s explanation consistent with 
the possibility that some rational agents might not care about some of the demands of 
morality.
What we do need to suppose, and what a strongly Humean view would not 
allow us to suppose, is that there is a sense in which we might relate rationality to 
certain emotions. There is a sense in which it might be rational to feel resentment only 
when we have been deliberately wronged, or feel guilt only when we have deliberately 
(or maybe negligently) caused some harm. It’s the fact that on certain occasions 
particular emotions might be seen to be justifiable, appropriate or in order (whether or 
not we are inclined, by reason or otherwise, to acknowledge this fact) that is our basis 
for saying that a moral reasons claim is true. This fact will not be falsified by a lack of 
subjective conditions on the agent’s part.
3.1.2 Rationality, Moral Normativity 8t Reactive Attitudes
It seems that rationality functions similarly to morality in terms of its normative 
force. We can be justly subject to criticism for acting irrationally, and we tend to think 
that when we consider matters carefully and correctly we will be led to feel some 
pressure to form beliefs and intentions that accord with the demands of reason. 
Likewise, we seem to be justly subject to criticism for acting immorally, and we tend to 
think when we consider matters carefully, this should lead us to feel some pressure to 
shape our actions in accordance with the demands of morality.
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Part of what appears especially significant about moral reasons, however, 
especially when we view them in relation to moral responsibility, regards the kind of 
attitudes that we might have towards others in relation to the way they view the 
demands of morality. In particular, it ’s in relation to moral concerns that span from 
judgements about the quality of people’s wills towards us that certain reactive attitudes 
seem justifiable. Such attitudes seem to be in important ways distinct from the kind of 
attitudes we have in relation to the way others view the demands of rationality. Whilst 
there is certainly also some similarity, it seems that the difference between these sets of 
attitudes shows us something about where we take the force of such sets of demands 
to lie. Specifically, it seems that such categories of demands are explained by quite 
different considerations.
The reason 1 want to consider the importance of reactive attitudes is that 1 
think this highlights some fundamental differences between where we take the 
normative force of morality to lie, and how we think this differs from the normative 
pressure associated with the demands of rationality. Specifically, 1 think we need to 
look at the situations in which certain reactive attitudes are considered to be in order, 
and to think about what explains this; what explains the fact that in some situations 
certain attitudes might be described as apt, appropriate, or justified, or at least 
something to that effect.
1 want to argue that the reactive attitudes associated with people’s responses to 
their moral obligations are what explain the force of those obligations. Hume argued 
(very roughly) that certain traits are morally virtuous on account of the fact that they 
give rise to love and admiration in others, and that other traits are vices because they 
give rise to hatred in others. This is far too simple. This might explain why some 
agents have reasons to be moral in Williams’s sense of “reason” (in terms of having the 
right belief and desire -  provided such a person happens to care about other people’s 
attitudes), but explaining the normative force of morality requires more than this.
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This is why 1 want to suggest that what is required is not just that ignoring a 
moral obligation will give rise to negative reactive attitudes, and that complying with it 
will give rise to positive ones. We also need such attitudes to be justifiable. It must 
not only be the case that a person would, as it happens, feel some resentment towards 
me for maliciously and deliberately causing them injury, but also that they would quite 
rightly fee] some resentment. Such a feeling would be justifiable; it would not count as 
irrational.
By examining the kinds of attitudes we have towards an agent who ignores the 
demands of morality, and considering the difference between the kind of attitudes we 
take to be appropriate in this sort of case, and the kind of attitudes we consider 
appropriate in the case of those who ignore the demands of reason, we should come to 
grasp more clearly the extent to which moral normativity and rational normativity are 
related, and to gauge some idea of the precise role we take the demands of reason to 
have in explaining our moral obligations.
When a person ignores the demands of morality, we tend to think that certain 
attitudes are appropriate. Those attitudes tend to be of the kind we would associate 
with the notion of moral blame. If a person deliberately harms us we will tend to think 
we have some justification for our feelings of resentment, and we think that the 
perpetrator would be justified in feeling some degree of remorse. These facts seem to 
play a significant role in why we think people have reason not to ignore the demands 
of morality in the first place.
In contrast, if  a person does not respond properly to the demands of rationality, 
and we are hurt as a result, our attitudes do not tend to be the same. If we suffered an 
injuiy because our safety was put at risk due to an error someone made in their 
calculations, we would only feel resentful if  we thought that they were consciously 
negligent in making those calculations, or if  they had shown a conscious lack of 
concern for our safety. If we thought such a person had just made an honest mistake 
in their reasoning, but had not neglected our interests, we might well think that we had
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no justification for feeling resentful, and we might not think that such a person was 
“blameworthy” in the same respect. We might also think such a person had no rational 
justification for feeling guilty or remorseful.
It’s in this sense Hume notes that the relation between reason and morality 
seems to be quite limited. Hume argued that morality cannot be grounded in reason 
on account of the fact that feelings of hatred or love, and the associated judgements of 
blame or praise, seem appropriate in response to morally relevant actions (concerning 
the ends an agent selects), but would not be appropriate as responses to the quality of 
the agent’s reasoning skills (which for Hume, includes just their capacity for a priori 
reasoning, and their ability to reason about means to certain ends). We can see his 
defence of this point in the following passage:
”A person may be affected with passion, by supposing a pain or pleasure to lie in an 
object, which has no tendency to produce either of these sensations, or which produces 
the contrary to what is imagin’d. A person may also take false measures for the 
attaining of his end, and may retard, by his foolish conduct, instead o f forwarding the 
execution of any project. These false judgments may be thought to affect the passions 
and actions, which are connected with them, and be said to render them unreasonable, 
in a figurative and improper way of speaking. But tho’ this be acknowledged, ’tis easy 
to observe, that these errors are so far from being the source of all immorality, that they 
are commonly very innocent, and draw no manner of guilt upon the person who is so 
unfortunate as to fall into them. They extend not beyond a mistake o f fact for which 
moralists have not generally suppos’d criminal, as being perfectly involuntary. 1 am 
more to be lamented than blam’d, if  1 am mistaken with regard to the influence of 
objects in producing pain or if  1 know not the proper means of satisfying my desires.
No one can ever regard such errors as a defect in my moral character”. '2
My own reasons for drawing this kind of distinction between moral and 
rational normativity are the same as Hume’s. Moral failings tend to be seen as 
especially serious in a way that rational failings are not. An agent’s willingness to 
neglect the morally relevant claims of others makes appropriate certain reactive
12 Hume, David. (1740), A Treatise o f Human Nature, Book 3, part 1, sect. 1, par. 12. (Oxford 
University Press) pp. 295-296.
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attitudes that would be entirely unjustified in response to an agent’s willingness to 
form irrational beliefs, or to go about achieving their goals in an illogical manner.
A person’s unwillingness to take the morally relevant claims of others into 
account would seem to give us some justification for certain attitudes, such as 
resentment on the part of the person harmed, remorse on the part of the agent, and 
perhaps condemnation of some kind on the part of others generally. These are the kind 
of judgements we associate with blame. Such attitudes would be entirely irrational or 
unjustified in response to another agent’s honest failings of rationality. If some agent 
does not use the best means to achieving some end, or makes some error in her 
mathematical calculations, we would not consider this to be a serious failing in the 
same way. A person badly affected might feel upset, but will have no grounds for 
resentment. The agent may feel regret, but will have no grounds for remorse. No one 
will have reason to feel condemnation, and no charge of blame would be justifiable.
This rules out certain forms of rationalism about morality, whereby an agent is 
taken to be acting morally only to the extent that she is acting rationally, and where we 
are forced to say that all rational agents will be moral purely in virtue of their 
rationality alone. But we can accept Hume’s point consistent with drawing the kind of 
link between morality and rationality that we would associate with Mill. If anything, 
M ill’s account seems to support Hume’s insights. We can explain the force of Hume’s 
points precisely in terms of the way that the wrongness of an act relates to the fact 
that we would be justified in feeling certain emotions in response to such an act.
3.2 Millian Theory, Moral Norms 8t the True and the Good
3.2.1 Moral Reasons 8t the Acceptance of Norms
1 would like to briefly clarify how what 1 have just been saying relates to the 
broader aims of this discussion. 1 want to argue that claims about morality are only
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true or forceful on the condition that there is an objective fact about moral value of 
the kind that Wolf requires as a condition of responsibility. 1 think that the existence 
of such objective values is implied by the fact that certain reactive attitudes could be 
genuinely considered rational or justifiable. 1 also take it that it must be possible for 
such attitudes to be justifiable in order for moral obligations to genuinely have the kind 
of normative force we associate with them.
The account that 1 am defending involves explaining the normative force of 
moral obligations in terms of the justifiability or aptness of certain reactive attitudes in 
response to certain acts, and then explaining how certain attitudes could be considered 
apt or justified in terms of what is objectively valuable -  in Wolfs words, “the true and 
the good”. We might want to understand the claim that there is a true and a good in 
terms of there actually being a correct system of norms; an objectively valid system of 
values, telling us to treat certain considerations as weighing in favour of certain acts.
In keeping with Wolfs account, the moral reasons that apply to an agent are 
not to do merely with the system of norms that the agent actually accepts, but are to 
do with those that are objectively valid -  irrespective of whether or not the agent 
accepts this. What actually makes a certain attitude justified will depend on “ the true 
and the good” .
On this account, the fact that an agent has a reason to perform some act will 
be explained by the fact that there is an objectively valid system of norms (a true and a 
good) that weighs in favour of performing that act. It is only on this condition, that 
certain reactive attitudes in response to an agent’s decision to perform the act could be 
justified. The normative pressure to respond to this reason is explained by the fact that 
such attitudes would be rationally justified. However, this kind of normative pressure 
does not rest on the fact that it is irrational for us to ignore our obligations. So we do 
not have to say that all rational agents who have thought about their actions properly 
will intend to meet their obligations purely in virtue of being rational agents.
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Morality will not depend in this kind of a way on rationality for its normative 
force, but the kind of relation it does involve will allow for the fact that morality has a 
parallel normative structure to the kind we associate with rationality: All moral agents 
who have thought about their actions properly will intend to meet their obligations 
purely in virtue of being moral. We will not be able to accuse those who do not meet 
their obligations of being irrational, but we could accuse them of being immoral. In 
fact, this is the only charge that would actually justify the appropriate negative reactive 
attitudes.
This accords much better with the fact that moral failings are seen as more 
serious than failings of rationality. It also accords well with the fact that the 
appropriateness of reactive attitudes relates to judgements about the quality of an 
agent’s will towards us. Because of this, the fact that such attitudes are sometimes 
justifiable also seems to be more to the point when it comes to considering what is 
actually wrong with an immoral act than judgements relating to an agent’s rational 
capacities could be.
Furthermore, there is a genuine basis for criticising a person on these grounds. 
The annoyance or hurt we might feel in relation to being treated badly is not so lacking 
in foundation. We would not have a good basis for the kind of reactive attitudes we 
associate with people’s responses to their moral obligations if  there were no difference 
at all between moral reasons and other reasons, and if  both were only important in 
relation to the agent’s rational capacities, since these considerations alone fall short of 
providing any justification for adopting such reactive attitudes.
3.2.2 Punishment Ft the Expressing of Feelings
So far, 1 have only been talking about our justifications for responding to 
certain actions with particular feelings and attitudes. 1 have not tried to associate 
moral reasons with any claims about what justification we might have for expressing
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those feelings, or for taking the fact that we are justified in feeling resentful to justify 
treating anyone differently.
These issues go beyond merely considering the appropriateness or rationality of 
reactive attitudes. Expressing our resentment is likely to be hurtful or damaging in 
some way to the person we feel resentful towards, so this brings us into the realm of 
actually punishing that person. 1 take it this would require a much stronger moral 
justification than the kind that’s at issue when we talk about what makes a certain 
reactive attitude rationally justifiable.
Whereas 1 find it plausible to suppose that if  some system of norms entitling us 
to basic moral consideration were taken to be objectively correct, then this in itself 
would be enough to justify or make appropriate our feelings of resentment towards 
someone who has caused us deliberate harm, 1 take it that actually having a 
justification for punishing that person would require significantly more than this. We 
would have to think that this would itself be supported by the correct system of norms.
Whether or not this could be the case is largely outside of the scope of this 
discussion. In contrast to the considerations about when particular attitudes are 
appropriate, 1 don’t take the issue of when certain forms of punishment are justifiable 
to be fundamental to understanding the force of moral obligations. The claim that 
actually punishing a person for their moral wrongdoing is justified is a much stronger 
claim than we need in order to make sense of moral normativity.
3.2.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, 1 have tried to establish that a broadly Millian view provides an 
account of moral reasons and the normative pressure we associate with them that 
avoids some of the problems we encounter when we tiy to explain such reasons with 
reference only to what actions are rational from an agent’s perspective. It also seems
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especially relevant when it comes to understanding the kind of attitudes we take to be 
appropriate in response to certain acts, and the way this relates to the notions of blame 
and praise.
This immediately brings us back to considerations that relate to moral 
responsibility, and to the issue of why we might think that moral reasons are related to 
moral responsibility. Strawson’s considerations about reactive attitudes and their 
relation to facts about the quality of an agent’s will towards others, in particular, seem 
to be veiy significant in relation to the initial question of moral responsibility.
In the following chapter, 1 want to return to Wolfs account of responsibility, 
and to reconsider certain aspects of Wolfs account in light of the some of the issues 
discussed in this chapter. 1 will then try to readdress the question of how we should 
formulate principles that best account for responsibility, and to reconsider the issue of 
whether responsibility and determinism are compatible in light of this revised approach.
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4 Reason. Reactive Attitudes St Freedom of the Will
The previous chapter aimed to defend a particular understanding of the 
normative force of moral reasons; one that’s distinct from that which we might 
associate with other reasons. This approach, influenced by Mill, involved linking moral 
reasons with reactive attitudes of the kind discussed by Strawson. The justifiability or 
aptness of particular attitudes was linked to there being some correct system of norms 
in relation to which certain acts might be considered right or wrong.
These considerations about reactive attitudes, and when such attitudes are 
rationally justifiable, relate to considerations about the quality of an agent’s will. This 
brings us back to issues that are directly relevant to the discussion that we started out 
with -  the issue of freedom and moral responsibility. 1 will argue that such 
considerations might lead us to reconsider certain aspects of Wolfs account, which 1 
have so far been defending.
1 will argue that many of the features that make Wolfs account so appealing 
could be accounted for in terms of actual features of the agent’s will, and that we can 
develop an account structurally very similar to Wolfs, but without having to impose 
alternate-sequence demands for responsibility in cases of blame, and so an account 
that would be consistent with the truth of determinism.
4.1 Wolf, Strawson Et Moral Responsibility
4.1.1 The Aims of this Discussion
To recap, the first chapter began with looking at Wolfs view that a responsible 
agent is one who is able to respond to objective reasons. In cases of praiseworthy
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action, this condition is met automatically when (in the actual sequence of events) the 
agent does the right thing for the right reason, as this entails that he is able to do the 
right thing for the right reason. For cases of blameworthy action, however, we have 
alternate-sequence conditions on Wolfs account. We require the outright possibility of 
an alternate sequence of events, holding all else constant. The fact that the agent did 
not do the right thing for the right reason is not enough. We need to know that the 
agent was able to do the right thing for the right reason before we can hold her 
responsible.
The last two chapters were aimed at supporting the idea that we could have 
objective reasons. Or at least, that we could have objective moral reasons, and so 
Wolfs account (or something like it) could, if  not explain responsibility more generally, 
at least help to explain moral responsibility. 1 tried to argue that our responses to 
certain acts could only be considered to be genuinely justified or appropriate in relation 
some objectively correct system of moral norms.
This paints a picture influenced by Mill and Strawson, in which the moral 
wrongness of an act is closely linked to the justifiability of particular reactive attitudes 
in response to it. On Strawson’s view, such attitudes are related to judgements about 
the quality of an agent’s will towards us. If an agent acts in a way which shows that 
the quality of his will towards us in not in accordance with a correct system of norms, 
then this may mean we have some justification for feeling resentful in response to 
being harmed by that act.
In many ways, this picture accords well with Wolfs account. It explains why 
we might think there are objective reasons, and also why this idea might play an 
important role in determining when certain reactive attitudes are justified.
Furthermore, such attitudes seem to be an essential part of our ordinary understanding 
of responsibility, and of what it is about acts that makes us consider them praiseworthy 
or blameworthy.
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At the same time, facts about the quality of an agent’s will towards others 
regard only the actual-sequence of events leading to an agent’s act. The truth of such 
facts seems largely independent of whether the agent was able to do anything else.
This account does not require the outright possibility of an alternate sequence of 
events holding all else constant, even for blameworthy acts. This is where the 
Strawsonian aspect of the picture seems to depart from Wolfs view.
There were numerous questions raised throughout the last three chapters that 
have been driving this discussion so far, and at this point it might be worth running 
through these again, as this will help to keep the bigger picture in perspective.
Firstly, there was the issue of whether or not we could even have reasons that 
are objective in the sense required for Wolfs account, whereby the truth of such 
reasons claims does not depend on the agent’s subjective motives. Secondly, there was 
the question of precisely how we should explain the normative force of moral 
obligations if  we cannot appeal to any desires the agent already has, in light of which 
such courses of action might seem rational from that agent’s perspective. In trying to 
deal with this issue, 1 appealed to the idea of there being an objectively correct system 
of moral norms, and looked at how this might relate to the justifiability of particular 
attitudes as responses to certain acts.
These aspects of the discussion are directly relevant to the original issue of 
responsibility. We now have a whole new set of considerations when it comes to 
accounting for responsibility, and in light of these considerations, we are in a better 
position to formulate new conditions of responsibility that account for these factors as 
well as those features that give Wolfs account its appeal. We can then readdress the 
question of whether responsibility requires actual or alternate sequence conditions (and 
hence whether responsibility is compatible with determinism).
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In order to answer this question, we will need to look at the way in which 
Strawson’s considerations about the quality of an agent’s will, and Wolfs 
considerations about ability to respond to objective reasons, relate to one another.
4.1.2 Reactive Attitudes, Quality of the Will 8t Responsibility
On both Wolfs account, and on the Millian/Strawsonian account 1 have tried to 
defend, the idea of there being a system of norms that is objectively correct plays an 
important role. The reasons for this are slightly different on each account, but equally 
important on both. On the one hand, we need some correct system of norms in order 
for certain reactive attitudes to be justifiable. On the other hand, an agent needs more 
than just the ability to respond to their own subjective system of values in order to be 
held morally responsible for their actions; they need to be able to base their subjective 
values on the true and the good.
On a broadly Strawsonian account, we respond to an agent with particular 
reactive attitudes in cases where we have reason to think the agent’s actions provide 
significant information about the quality of that agent’s will towards us. For a very 
young child or someone suffering psychosis, we might think that we cannot make this 
kind of an inference between their actions and facts about the quality of their will.
They are not able to meaningfully understand or engage in the kind of interpersonal 
exchange within which such attitudes make sense.
This kind of consideration relates to something Flume pointed out: We only 
consider an act to be blameworthy if  it ’s likely to tell us about the agent’s motivations 
and character. If someone acts through coercion, ignorance, or mental illness, we 
cannot make this kind of inference. This fits well with the idea that an action has to 
tell us something about the quality of an agent’s will towards others i f  it ’s going to be 
rational for us to respond with any particular reactive attitude.
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In relation to Wolf, it seems that similar considerations play a role in some of 
her examples. She notes that we would not hold an agent responsible for pressing a 
button that would electrocute someone in the next room if  we thought that he did not 
know that this is what pressing the button would do. Likewise, we would not hold 
someone responsible who did not know that being electrocuted was a painful or 
unpleasant experience. But further to this, we would not hold an agent responsible 
who (as difficult as this is to imagine) could not understand that it was wrong to cause 
pain to people.
If an agent is led, through her unimaginably horrendous upbringing, to have 
absolutely no concept of why we should show any kind of consideration or respect 
towards others, she may end up accepting a very skewed system of norms. Her values 
will be determined by her disturbing upbringing, and not by the true and the good. 
Because of this, whether or not she is able to act in accordance with the system of 
norms she actually accepts will be irrelevant to whether we should hold her responsible. 
We need to know whether she is able to act in accordance with the system of norms 
that’s actually valid -  with the true and the good. If she doesn’t know that causing 
pain is wrong, then supposedly she cannot reasonably be expected to shape her 
motivations in accordance with this fact.
So we might think that a genuinely good-willed agent is one who is motivated 
to do the right thing, whatever that may be. A good-willed agent will want to treat 
others the way that he morally ought to. But a person who, through no fault of his 
own, has been led to accept a system of values that differs drastically from the values 
there actually are, will not really have the opportunity to act in accordance with the 
true and the good, even if  he wants to. In such a case, his willingness to cause pain 
might not tell us much about whether he is motivated to do the right thing. If his 
values are momentously flawed, we will not know whether he is good-willed enough 
that he would have done the right thing had he actually known what the right thing to 
do was. It ’s only if  he’s actually able to do the right thing that it is fair to hold him 
responsible when he fails to.
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It seems then, that the issue of how good-willed the agent is plays an 
important role in both the kind of considerations that are motivating Strawson’s 
account, and the kind that are motivating Wolfs.
For Strawson, the fact that an agent is able to meaningfully engage in 
interpersonal exchange, and to properly understand the kind of demands that 
characterise people’s moral expectations of one another, is enough to tell us that when 
that agent neglects the morally relevant claims of others, he does so despite the fact 
that he understands the moral significance of his actions. This gives us reason to think 
that such an agent is not good-willed. Negative reactive attitudes are a direct response 
to this.
On Wolfs account, if  an agent is able to act in accordance with the true and 
the good, this tells us that if  she chooses not to do so, this is genuinely an expression 
of her unwillingness to do so. This also tells us such an agent is not good-willed.
However, on a Strawson-style account the test is whether the agent 
understands the moral significance of what he is doing, whereas on a Wolf-style 
account, the test is whether the agent is capable of doing anything better. (If an agent 
does not understand the significance of what he’s doing, this might be important, but 
just because it implies the agent is not capable of doing anything better).
Both accounts seem to represent perfectly intelligible rationales forjudging 
something that seems to be significant in determining when it is rational to feel 
resentment in response to some agent’s act -  namely, whether the act is really an 
expression of bad-wili on the agent’s part. However, Wolfs condition is an alternate- 
sequence one, and Strawson’s condition is an actual-sequence one.
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4.2 Considering What Matters Most for Responsibility
4.2.1 Conditions of Responsibility
Whatever precise conditions of responsibility are the important ones, the 
agent’s ability to know right from wrong seems to be a key feature. The reason it 
seems that we do not want to hold an agent responsible who is incapable of engaging 
in the kind of interpersonal exchange that characterises our moral expectations of one 
another, is that such an agent cannot possibly know what the moral significance of 
their actions are. Likewise, on Wolfs account, whether the agent is able to respond to 
the reasons that there are is very closely linked with whether or not that agent knows 
what reasons there actually are.
On Strawson’s account, we might think that the condition of being able to 
engage in the overall web of reactive attitudes is important because it tells us about 
whether or not that agent can be expected to fully comprehend what constitutes right 
and wrong. If so, knowing about moral reasons will be the more fundamental 
consideration forjudging what some act tells us about the quality of an agent’s will. 
However, on Wolfs account, the key factor is the agent’s ability to respond to objective 
reasons. Whether or not the agent understands the difference between right and 
wrong is only important insofar as it tells us something about her ability to respond to 
the reasons there are.
The kind of examples Wolf uses to demonstrate her point often involve agents 
who have a misguided set of values, and so do not actually know what reasons there 
really are. Wolf takes this to be significant because of the fact that such an agent 
could not reasonably be expected to be capable of responding to objective reasons.
But we might wonder whether this really is the important point, or whether it ’s merely 
the fact that the agent doesn’t have a good grasp of right and wrong to begin with 
that accounts for the intuition that such an agent cannot be held responsible for his 
actions.
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I f  it ’s just whether or not the agent knows the difference between right and 
wrong that matters, we will only require an actual-sequence condition for 
responsibility. If this only matters insofar as it tells us about the agent’s ability to do 
otherwise, however, we will also require the outright possibility of an alternate 
sequence with certain features. But we now have a task similar to the one that 
concerned Hurley. We have an actual-sequence principle and an alternate-sequence 
principle, and we need some way to work out which one is actually doing the work in 
determining whether or not an agent is responsible.
Hurley tried to work out whether it was Fischer’s condition of acting on a 
reasons-responsive mechanism or Wolfs condition of being able to respond to objective 
reasons that matters. This case is somewhat different. We have Wolfs principle, and 
one that’s similar to it, but which does not impose any alternate sequence demands.
We want to know whether it ’s the fact that an agent knows what reasons there are or 
the fact that an agent is able to respond to those reasons that determines whether she 
is responsible.
However, this might be problematic. The fact that an agent is able to respond 
to objective reasons seems to imply that that agent knows what reasons there are. 
Likewise, if  an agent does not know what reasons there are, it seems that we could not 
reasonably expect her to respond to those reasons.
The other way round, we do not have this problem, but we run into different 
ones. An agent may well know what the right thing to do is, but be unable to respond 
to such facts because of coercion or restraint of some kind. But clearly, this in itself 
will not show that it ’s only ability that matters. If knowledge of right and wrong is 
important in terms of what it tells us about the quality of an agent’s will, then we 
would need the agent’s response to those reasons to be a genuine response to their 
understanding of right and wrong. If the agent is not in a position to be acting in 
light o f  their state of knowledge, then such actions will not be relevant.
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Likewise, i f  an agent is restrained from doing the right thing, this doesn’t imply 
that he won’t know what the right thing to do is, but it does mean that his actions will 
not quality as being those actions he chooses despite his knowledge of what’s right. 
They will instead be actions he is forced into completely irrespective of such knowledge.
Supposing some agent has made a promise to meet someone who has helped 
him greatly, and to whom the agent knows this meeting is very important. He may be 
fully aware of having an obligation to keep his promise to meet her at the arranged 
time, and may fully understand the significance of his failing to do this, fully grasping 
how hurt her feelings will be. But if, through no fault of his own, the agent is locked 
in a room with no way to escape and no way to contact the person to whom this duty 
is owed, we would not hold him responsible for his failure to turn up. If the person he 
was meeting found out about his predicament, we might expect her to feel 
disappointment, but hurt feelings or resentment would seem out of place. In this case, 
we can see that the agent’s grasp of right and wrong alone is not enough.
However, we don’t need to say that such an agent could only be responsible on 
the condition that he had been able to do the right thing for the right reason either. It 
might still be that the agent’s understanding of right and wrong plays an important 
role, but it plays this role only insofar as it tells us something about that agent’s 
willingness to do the right thing -  and willingness to do the right thing seems clearly 
distinct from ability to do the right thing. We might think that the act is not one the 
agent is responsible for because it doesn’t tell us anything about the kind of value that 
agent places on doing what he knows is right.
In this kind of case, it seems the important factor is the agent’s level of 
willingness to do the right thing. I f  we knew that such an agent was veiy willing to do 
the right thing, and that he placed a very high value on keeping his promises, showing 
gratitude where it ’s owed, and not hurting people’s feelings, we would have reason to 
suspect that had he been able to do the right thing, he would have done. But we
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might think that it ’s neither the ability to do the right thing, nor the truth of the 
counterfaetual “he would have acted rightly, if  he could have done” that matters.
These features might only be important because they tell us something about 
the value the agent places on doing what he knows to be right. I f  the agent is 
restrained beyond his own control from keeping his promise, then his failing to meet 
this duty tells us nothing about his attitude towards what he knows to be right and 
wrong. His act is irrelevant to what he understands to be the right thing to do. So 
perhaps we would only hold him responsible i f  we thought he was consciously acting 
despite the fact that he knows what he does is wrong.
It seems there is a clear difference between an act that happens irrespective of 
an agent’s knowledge, and an act that the agent performs despite his knowledge. In 
the former case, the agent’s reasons for acting are such that they do not relate to the 
value that agent places on his understanding of right and wrong. In the latter case, the 
act results precisely from unwillingness on the agent’s part to accord the kind of value 
to a course of action that he knows it to be worthy of.
On any account, we might have good reason to suppose that knowledge of 
right and wrong is a necessary condition of responsibility, but just stated in these 
simple terms, it ’s not enough to count as a sufficient condition. We need more than 
just the fact that the agent knows right from wrong. As the above example shows, if  
she is going to be held responsible for her act, we need that act to count as an 
expression of her attitude towards that knowledge. We need it to relate to her 
willingness to act in accordance with what she knows is morally correct.
1 want to suggest that we reconstruct the actual-sequence principle as follows: 
The agent will be responsible for an act if  she has a good understanding of what 
reasons there are objectively and that act is genuinely an expression of her actual 
willingness (or unwillingness) to take those reasons into consideration.
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4.2.2 Comparing Conditions
We now need to work out which condition is closer to what actually accounts 
for responsibility; whether it ’s the fact that an agent knows right from wrong, and his 
act is an expression of his level of willingness to take this into account, or rather the 
fact that he is able to respond to the reasons there are.
The fact both seem to be relevant considerations may be best explained by 
supposing that one of these is important in itself, and one is important simply due to 
its relation to the other. But we do not yet know which should be considered more 
fundamental. Is the fact that an agent is unable to respond to objective reasons only 
important because it tells us that their action is not an expression of their level of 
willingness to place the correct value on their understanding of right and wrong? Or is 
it that their act being an expression of their willingness to place the correct value of 
their understanding of right and wrong is only important because it tells us that they 
are capable of responding to objective reasons?
It seems it could only be the actual-sequence condition that is more 
fundamental, and the alternate-sequence condition that is only important because of 
what it tells us about whether the agent meets the actual-sequence one. The agent’s 
ability to act in accordance with the reasons there are is important because it implies 
that the agent’s failure to do so is an expression of their attitude towards those 
reasons; an expression of the importance they place on treating others the way that 
they know they morally ought to.
1 think that it must be this way around because the inference would not be 
valid the other way around. We cannot infer from the fact that an agent’s act is an 
expression of their unwillingness to take considerations of right and wrong into 
account that such an agent is capable of making a better decision, and yet this still 
seems to be a relevant consideration.
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I f  we suppose the thesis of determinism to be true, this would entail that there 
were never cases in which an agent is capable of doing something other than what she 
does in fact do. This would mean that if  an agent does not do the right thing for the 
right reason, she is not able to do the right thing for the right reason, since it will never 
be an outright possibility holding all else constant. But this does not entail that such 
an agent doesn’t act despite her understanding of right and wrong. It might still be 
that her action is an expression of her unwillingness to treat certain possible courses of 
action in a way that reflects the moral value she knows them to be worthy of.
The relevance of this condition cannot be explained by its relation to 
considerations about an agent’s ability to do the right thing for the right reason. It 
seems to be important in its own right. This is hardly a conclusive argument to show 
that ability is not important. But it does rule out the idea that the actual-sequence 
principle is only important because of what it tells us about the agent’s ability to 
respond to objective reasons. This leaves us with some pretty good reasons to favour 
the actual-sequence condition.
Firstly, if  someone were to find conclusive evidence that our actions were 
causally determined (and hence Wolfs alternate-sequence condition was never met), it 
seems implausible to suppose that the actual-sequence considerations about whether 
an agent fully grasps right and wrong, and whether their actions are expressions of 
their willingness to take this into account, would become entirely irrelevant to the 
question of moral responsibility. We would at least still think that such considerations 
played an important role in determining when it would be rational for the victims of 
certain acts to feel resentful in response, or for the perpetrators to feel remorseful.
Secondly, we can account for our intuitions about which cases we should 
consider an agent to be morally responsible in, purely with reference to facts about that 
agent’s grasp of right and wrong, and whether the act is an expression of her 
willingness to take this into account, without having to commit ourselves to 
indeterminism.
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I f  we can adequately differentiate between cases where we do not want to 
bold an agent responsible and cases where we do, just by looking at features of the 
actual sequence, we might think this undermines our largest motive for adopting a 
condition that requires the outright possibility of an alternate sequence. I f  we don’t 
have to make this strong a claim in order to sustain an account of responsibility that 
works, this seems to be a good motive for rejecting it. I t ’s unnecessary to hang onto 
an account that’s consistent with less metaphysical possibilities despite the fact it has 
no extra explanatory force that we cannot find without it.
4.2.3 A Reformulated Account
I f  we accept that considerations about the quality of an agent’s will are what 
matters most for moral responsibility, and that this is best assessed with reference just 
to an agent’s state of knowledge with regard to right and wrong, and with whether or 
not the agent’s act is an expression of his willingness to take this knowledge into 
account when deciding how to treat others, we end up with an account somewhat 
different both to Wolfs account, and to the kind of account that Strawson offers. 1 
will try to summarise exactly what the distinctive features of this view of responsibility 
are.
On this view, we distinguish relevant features of the agent and relevant features 
of the act. In order for an agent to be responsible for an act, we have conditions that 
relate to both, each of which is necessary for responsibility, and the conjunction of 
which is sufficient for it. I t ’s necessary that the agent has a good grasp of what 
reasons there are. I t ’s also necessary that the act is one that’s actually an expression of 
her willingness to take into account her knowledge of what’s morally right in deciding 
how to treat others. I f  both of these conditions are met, the agent will be responsible 
for the act.
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Both of these conditions are asymmetric in a very similar way to Wolfs 
condition, but only if  we take into account the importance of acting on the right 
reason. 1 will tiy to demonstrate what 1 mean by this in relation to both the agent- 
centred and the act-centred conditions.
Wolf argues that an agent can only be held responsible who is able to do the 
right thing for the right reason. On this agent-centred condition, in contrast, an agent 
can only be held responsible who knows what it  is to do the right thing for the right 
reason. For Wolf, i f  an agent does the right thing for the right reason, her condition 
has automatically been met, since actually doing the right thing for the right reason 
automatically implies that he is able to do the right thing for the right reason.
On this account, the condition is not met merely because the agent does the 
right thing, but as with Wolfs account, it seems that it is met when an agent does the 
right thing for the right reason, since this implies that the act is based on her 
understanding of what is right. Supposedly, the right kind of reason to do something 
will have to relate in some way to the fact that the agent knows it ’s the right thing to 
do.
An agent might do the right thing because she is acting despite her flawed 
system of norms, and actually doesn’t realise she is doing the right thing at all. E.g. 
she has been hypnotised to believe that the polite thing to do when meeting someone 
for the first time is to punch them in the face, but she chooses not to, despite thinking 
that it ’s the right thing to do, and instead shakes their hand. She does this merely 
because she considers herself to be a bit of a rebel and wants to cause offence. But 
supposedly in this kind of case, she will not be acting for the right kind of reason -  she 
will not be acting on the basis of her knowledge of the true and the good. So for both 
Wolfs condition, and this account’s agent-centred condition, i f  an agent does the right 
thing specifically for the right reason, we have already established she is responsible for 
her act (although on this account merely doing the right thing is not enough if  we do 
not know what kind of reason she was acting on).
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With regard to whether the agent’s act is really an expression of the importance 
that agent places on treating others in the way she ought to (the act-centred 
condition), it also seems like this condition is automatically met in the case of 
praiseworthy action, where the agent does the right thing specifically for the right 
reason. Again, this is because the agent would not be acting for the right kind of a 
reason if  that agent’s act were entirely irrelevant to her understanding of the true and 
the good. E.g. the agent keeps her promise to stay indoors today, but only does so 
because she has accidentally locked herself in the house.
Since supposedly, the agent will only be acting for the right kind of a reason on 
the condition that her understanding of the true and the good is actually playing some 
role in motivating her to perform the act, the fact she has done the right thing for the 
right reason already implies that her act is an expression of the importance she places 
on doing the right thing.
So this account is similar to Wolfs in that (so long as we take it to be 
important in praiseworthy acts that the agent does the right thing for the right reason) 
it preserves the asymmetry between cases of praise and blame. For cases where the 
agent fails to do the right thing for the right reason, the conditions of responsibility 
will not be met automatically. In order to know whether an agent is responsible for his 
act, we need to know whether he has a good grasp of right and wrong, and whether his 
act is an expression of the value he accords this.
This account also preserves the importance that Wolf places on there being a 
true and a good, and on this playing some role in the agent’s reasons for action. It 
holds on to the supposition that there is some correct system of norms, and that the 
agent needs to bear the right kind of relation to this correct system of norms in order 
to be held responsible for his act. The difference is just to do with the precise relation 
that’s taken to be relevant. For Wolf, the agent must have the ability to shape her 
actions in accordance with the true and the good, whereas on this account, the agent
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must have a good understanding of the true and the good, and her actions must 
express her attitude towards what she knows to be morally right. But she does not 
need the outright ability to act in accordance with the true and the good, keeping all 
else constant.
This is where this account also bears a close relation to Strawson’s. On 
Strawson’s account, considerations about whether or not an agent is able to do 
otherwise are largely irrelevant to anything that we take to be important to us about 
moral responsibility. The considerations that seem to matter are those that concern the 
quality of the agent’s will towards others. For judgements about the quality of an 
agent’s will to matter or make sense, that agent needs to be able to meaningfully 
engage in the exchange of reactive attitudes that characterise our moral demands and 
expectations of one another.
This seems to be relevant not only because such agents cannot respond in any 
constructive way to the kind of reactive attitudes that would be relevant to their 
actions, but also because such actions do not tell us much about the quality of an 
agent’s will. I f  an agent cannot understand this kind of interaction, he will not be able 
to have an adequate grasp of the moral significance of his actions, and so will not have 
a good understanding of how he ought to treat others. We cannot infer from such an 
agent’s actions anything about whether that agent is concerned to treat others in the 
way that he ought to. He is not responsible, because he cannot meaningfully engage 
with the kind of considerations that are relevant to understanding what he ought 
morally to do.
This strategy of thinking about the agent’s knowledge of right and wrong, her 
attitudes when it comes to taking such considerations into account, and what this tells 
us about the quality of her will, focuses responsibility on the actual sequence. This is 
why such an account, although in various ways very similar to Wolfs, is a compatibilist 
account. We do not require the outright possibility of an alternate sequence of events, 
even for cases of blameworthy action.
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4.3 Frankfurt's Case f t  Hurley's Question
4.3.1 Reconsidering Hurley, Fischer 8t the Frankfurt Example
At this point, it might be worth saying a bit about Frankfurt’s case. The 
problem 1 outlined in the first chapter, with using the example to show that even in the 
case of determinism, the existence of alternate possibilities could be seen as irrelevant, 
is that determinism poses distinct problems that cannot be accounted for so easily. In 
the case of determinism, we are concerned about the possibility of some alternate 
sequence, whereas in the Frankfurt case, we are looking just at its content.
The fact that the cases differ in this way, leaves open that some alternate- 
sequence principle (such as that offered by Wolf) could be relevant in a way that the 
example does not challenge. Unlike with Frankfurt’s case, determinism does not just 
concern what would happen if  an agent chooses not to perform some act, it also 
affects whether or not that agent actually does perform that act. And unlike 
Frankfurt’s counterfactual intervener, we cannot just add or subtract determinism from 
our example and assume that an agent’s actions can be assessed in the same way in 
either case.
Hurley’s strategy to show that Frankfurt’s irrelevant alternative intuition does 
generalise to the case of determinism, involved arguing that whereas the agent’s 
meeting the actual-sequence condition makes a considerable difference to whether we 
want to hold the agent responsible for her actions, whether or not the agent meets the 
alternate-sequence principle makes no difference at all. But because her alternate- 
sequence principle involved considering what the agent does in a possible world where 
determinism is false, her account rested on the kind of answer she thought we could 
give to a question that simply cannot be answered.
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Hurley’s mistake was in thinking that such a question could be answered, and 
this is because she thought such an answer could be inferred from features of the 
actual-sequence. But this inference appears to be faulty, and that is because it turns 
out to be an instance of the conditional fallacy. She tries to work out what the agent 
would do if  she could have acted on an entirely different mechanism by looking at the 
features of the actual mechanism, when these might play no role at all in the agent’s 
choice in the alternate sequence. I f  indeterminism was true, we could no longer rely on 
features of the actual mechanism being present, as the truth of such a thesis may well 
make it false that the agent acts on this mechanism in the first place.
We might, however, think that the account of responsibility 1 am defending
explains why Hurley’s question seems compelling in the first place. I f  we knew that an 
agent would do exactly the same thing even if  he could choose not to, this might imply 
that the act is genuinely an expression of the importance that he places on acting as he 
does. If he has a good grasp of right and wrong, then, the act would genuinely be an 
expression of his willingness to take this into account.
Whether the agent knows right from wrong to begin with is not considered a 
necessary condition on Hurley’s account. Instead, she favours Fischer’s condition. The 
agent needs to be acting on a sufficiently reasons-responsive mechanism. So for 
Hurley, if  an agent acts on a sufficiently reasons-responsive mechanism, and that agent 
would act on exactly the same mechanism in a nearby possible world where he could 
have acted on an alternate one, then we can hold him responsible for his act.
Hurley’s account is in some respects similar to the one 1 am defending.
However, both of her conditions suffer serious problems that could be avoided. On the 
one hand, her first condition, is one for which there may be no answer as to whether or 
not it is fulfilled, since we simply have no way to settle the question of whether the 
agent would do otherwise where this entails acting on a different mechanism 
altogether. On the other hand, her Fischer-influenced second condition of acting on a
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reasons-responsive mechanism is analogous to Nozick’s condition for knowledge, and 
so is subject to the same kind of counterexamples that affect Nozick’s account.
Now we have developed new conditions of responsibility, we should be able to 
generate analogous counterexamples by considering cases in which these conditions 
and Fischer’s conditions come apart: cases where the agent acts on a reasons- 
responsive mechanism, but the agent’s act is not a reflection of their attitude towards 
what they know to be morally right, and vice-versa.
To recap, Fischer’s reasons-responsiveness conditions are as follows:
(1) In other (on maximal responsiveness, nearby) possible worlds where there is 
reason to perform the act, the same mechanism would lead the agent to 
perform that act.
(2) I f  it were not the case (in nearby possible worlds where it ’s not the case) that 
there was reason to perform the act, the agent would not have performed the 
act.
We can see that these conditions cannot be necessary or sufficient for 
responsibility when we consider the following counterexamples.
Firstly, an agent may be responsible despite failing condition (1).
A man donates money to a worthy charity out of a sense of social duty. There 
is optimal reason for him to do this. However, there have been false reports published, 
claiming that a particular company will double any donations made to that charity if  
you give the money to them. Actually they are just stealing money that would go 
towards a worthy charity. Someone distracts this man just before he gets the chance to 
read these reports. Had he read them, however, he would have believed them, and so if  
he had acted on his sense of social duty, he would have given his money to this corrupt 
company instead of giving it to charity.
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In this case, he would fail condition (1). Yet it still seems that we should hold 
him responsible for his act when he is doing the right thing. He acts in light of his 
understanding of why he has reason to give his money to the charity, on the basis of 
his sense of social duty. The fact that this mechanism (his sense of social duty) would 
lead him to do something else in a nearby possible world should not diminish his 
responsibility in any way. The act should still count as praiseworthy, as it reflects his 
willingness to do what he knows he morally ought to.
It also seems that an agent may be responsible despite failing condition (2):
An agent owes her friend £50. She gives her friend the money on the basis of 
being overly anxious to always promptly pay back any money she owes. As it happens, 
she is so overly anxious in this respect, that the same mechanism of being anxious to 
pay back money promptly, would have led her to persuade herself that she owed this 
person £50, and to give her the money, even if  she had not owed her any money, and 
had no good reason to perform such an act. Despite this, it seems that we would have 
good reason to hold her responsible for her act. Her act would still be just as 
praiseworthy, as it expresses her willingness to do what she knows she morally ought 
to.
It also seems that an agent could pass both of Fischer’s conditions, and still not 
be responsible for her act.
Lucy is a paranoid schizophrenic who has a tendency to form wildly unlikely 
paranoid delusions about her neighbours trying to kill her on the basis of insufficient 
pieces of evidence. As a result, all of those in her community are very careful to make 
sure that she never experiences anything at all suspicious or out-of-the-ordinary, so as 
not to set her off. One day, she looks out of her window, and she sees someone on the 
street stop for a moment and glance in her direction (the kind of thing people around 
her would generally avoid doing in case they trigger any more delusions). She
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concludes from this event that her next door neighbour is part of an elaborate 
conspiracy to kill her, and that he has paid this person to check that she is at home so 
that he can come round and shoot her. She decides she had better quickly go to his 
house and kill him, in self-defence, before he gets the chance to kill her first. As it 
happens, she was absolutely right, and all of these beliefs were true.
If it hadn’t been the case that her neighbour wanted to kill her, and that she 
had reason to kill him first, she would not have seen someone glance in her direction 
(since, unbeknownst to her, those in her community go to enormous efforts not to do 
that kind of thing), and so she would not have been subject to the delusion, and she 
would not have killed her neighbour. Any other situation where she had reason to kill 
her neighbour, and where she was acting on the basis of the same mechanism -  her 
paranoid schizophrenic delusions about her neighbour’s intention to kill her -  would 
have led her to do the same thing. So she passes both of Fischer’s conditions. But it 
would not be right to hold her responsible for her act because she was acting on the 
basis of her paranoid schizophrenic delusion. The fact that such a mechanism, in her 
situation, happens to track reason doesn’t make her responsible for her act.
In these examples, the conditions under which the mechanism is responsive to 
reasons come apart from the conditions under which the agent’s act is based on their 
willingness to take into consideration their understanding of the true moral significance 
of the act. Here we find that it ’s the latter conditions that determine when we should 
hold the agent responsible. So it seems the Fischer-influenced condition Hurley adopts 
is only relevant in the cases where it might imply that the agent understands what is 
right and that their act is an expression of their willingness to take this into account.
It seems then, both of Hurley’s conditions are really aimed at trying to 
determine something more fundamental -  whether the agent is basing their actions on 
the value they place on what they know to be morally correct. Knowing that an agent 
would not do the right thing even if  she could only seems relevant if  we think it tells us 
something about that agent’s willingness to treat others as they know they morally
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ought to. On it ’s own in relation to determinism, it ’s not even clear that it ’s a 
coherently answerable question, so it ’s force must relate to what it tells us about 
something that we can give an intelligible answer to.
4.3.2 Responsibility for Skewed Values
The idea that an agent will not be responsible if  she is acting on the basis of a 
faulty system of values might seem problematic. Sometimes it seems like our 
resentment towards a person is justified precisely on the basis of the fact that she 
adopts a skewed system of values. E.g. a guard at a Nazi concentration camp might 
well fully believe in what she is doing, and believe that her actions are really in 
accordance with the true and the good. Just the mere fact that they are not in 
accordance the true and the good, on its own, certainly shouldn’t be enough to get her 
off the hook. We might feel even more contempt for her because of the fact that she 
could actually accept this system of norms in the first place.
The issue here will have to turn on whether or not we actually hold the agent 
responsible for her acceptance of a particular set of norms to begin with. We will need 
to ask whether she is responsible for her own ignorance regarding what is actually true 
and good.
The adopting of a particular set of norms will have to be considered an action 
assessable in the same way as any other. We will need to know whether she 
understood her duty to develop a good understanding of certain kinds of relevant 
information when she formulated her current system of values, and whether her 
adopting the norms she does is based on her failure to take this duty into 
consideration.
The case of becoming a Nazi seems especially striking because it seems as 
though the relevant information about the wrongness of the act is quite readily
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available. Anyone whose upbringing has allows them a basic grasp of human rights at 
all seems to be equally in a position to apply that information to another race that 
share the same morally relevant features. This is why extreme racism seems especially 
difficult to forgive. It seems like anyone who can apply the correct level of moral 
consideration to their own race, and has basic reasoning skills, should have all the 
relevant information available to them in order to grasp that the same level of moral 
concern is owed to others. We cannot imagine that there were many Nazis who lacked 
the basic understanding of right and wrong required to formulate better ideals to begin 
with.
It ’s worth noting, however, that we can imagine cases where these conditions 
for responsibility were not met. E.g. we might not hold her responsible i f  we found out 
that from a very young age she was taught that all other races were actually robots 
programmed to act just like humans, but who actually did not have any more conscious 
experience than your average toaster (we must suppose that she had no access to 
arguments for computational theories of the mind that might lead her to suspect that 
even robots could have conscious experience). I f  this information was perpetuated in 
an elaborate conspiracy throughout her entire life, and she had never heard anything 
that could lead her to suspect this was false, then we might think she was not 
responsible for adopting a system of norms that gave her own race a superior moral 
status.
Likewise, if  we thought her adopting of skewed norms was not an expression of 
the importance she placed on formulating a system of values that was based what she 
knew to be morally right, we would not hold her responsible. E.g. i f  she was 
brainwashed or hypnotised into accepting her skewed system of norms.
Wolf often uses the example of an agent who had never once in his life 
witnessed anyone showing the slightest bit of kindness or consideration to anyone else. 
She also supposes that whenever he showed any kindness himself, this was taken
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advantage of and he suffered as a result. We might understand if  this person thought 
that the only valuable course of action involved being entirely selfish.
This would be a very extreme case. It ’s hard to imagine anyone actually being 
this deprived of moral input. But i f  an agent was actually brought up in such a 
situation, we clearly could not blame him for lacking any grasp of what is morally right 
and wrong. I f  he were to cause pain to another person, we would have to consider this 
a terrible consequence of the horrendous situation he was led to formulate his system 
of values in. We could not hold him responsible for his act.
In real life, we do not expect that people are dealing with such an extreme lack 
of moral input, but nonetheless, there will clearly be some cases in which an agent 
cannot be expected to encounter the information available to base some of their norms 
on what is actually true and good. In such cases, it would not be fair to hold the agent 
responsible for the acts that she performs on the basis of those skewed values.
However, there may also many cases where we do think agents are responsible for their 
own ignorance about right and wrong, and in such cases the mere fact they have a 
skewed system of values alone will not get them off the hook.
We will need to add a clause to our conditions. If a condition seems to have 
been failed, we also need to know whether the agent is responsible for this fact. This 
will be determined by applying these same conditions to the decisions that led the 
agent to his current values and attitudes.
4.3.3 Conclusion
It seems we have good grounds to suppose that the factors that really matter in 
attributing responsibility are firstly, that the agent has a good understanding of what is 
morally right and wrong, and secondly, that the act is genuinely an expression of the 
importance that agent places on treating others in the way she knows that she morally
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ought to. I f  the agent fails either of these conditions, he will not be held responsible, 
unless of course, he is responsible for his own failure of the conditions (and this is 
something we can judge by the same criteria).
This differs both from Strawson’s view in some respects, and from Wolfs view 
in some respects, but is aimed at assessing something that seems to be fundamental on 
both accounts: what the act tells us about the quality of an agent’s will towards others. 
Specifically, what it tells us about that agent’s level of willingness to treat other people 
the way they morally ought to.
This also seems to account for what is driving Hurley to ask about what the 
agent would have done had that agent been able to do otherwise. But this question is 
not one that we can give a meaningful answer to in relation to determinism, and so the 
account 1 am defending avoids this problem, and also accounts for responsibility in 
cases where Fischer and Hurley’s reasons-responsiveness principle fails.
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